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I Introduction
Consider the following hypothetical scenario: The government has
charged the defendant with the felony of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, and ajury trial is setto begin. During jury selection, the court asks
the potential jurors whether any ofthem is a convicted felon. All the prospec-
tive jurors deny any felony convictions. The prosecutor then asks whether any
of the prospective jurors has been arrested or convicted of any criminal
offense. Again, all the potential jurors answer in the negative. At the conclu-
sion of voir dire,' twelve jurors sit in the jury box ready to hear the case.
Juror X is a convicted felon, although his answer to the court's question was
not a lie intended to deceive the court. X simply thought his conviction for
grand larceny was not a felony because his guilty plea resulted only in a fine.
X thought all felonies required a jail sentence of a year or more. Juror Y's
criminal history includes a conviction for misdemeanor possession of mari-
juana. Y chose to deny this conviction because he disagrees with the govern-
ment's policy of criminalizing the recreational use of 1rugs. Yalso did not see
the need to embarrass himself in open court by admitting his drug use. Juror
Z has never been convicted of a crime. However, Z once was arrested for
prostitution. Z denied this arrest because she did not want to humiliate herself
by admitting to an arrest for such a degrading crime, particularly when the
1. See BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990) (defining voir dire as "the prelim-
inary examination which the court and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their
qualification and suitability to serve as jurors").
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prosecutor had dropped the charges. In addition, Z views her arrest as result-
ing from nothing less than police entrapment.
An impartial jury is the "touchstone of a fair trial. '"2 Like the defendant,
the government has a right to an impartial jury.3 However, in the scenario
described above, the potential for juror bias against the government's case is
high.4 Not only does Juror X's felony conviction create a potential for bias
against the government,5 it disqualifies him from jury service.6 X's ineligibil-
ity could provide the basis for an appellate court to overturn any conviction
the defendant may receive.7 The experiences of Juror Yand Juror Z, while not
disqualifying them from jury service, may cause them to be prejudiced against
the government's case. Y's feelings about the illegality of drug use may
adversely affect his consideration of the government's case against the defen-
dant. Likewise, Z's distrust of the tactics that the police used in her case may
cause her to view unfairly the government's evidence against the defendant
with extreme suspicion.
In order to uncover these potential biases, prosecutors use lists containing
the names of prospective jurors to check their criminal histories.8 Prosecutors
then use that information as a basis for removing jurors in voir dire.9 Despite
the important implications of this practice, ° neither courts nor legal scholars
have devoted much attention to answering the fundamental question of
whether prosecutors should use the criminal history records of potential jurors
2. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) ("One
touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact - 'a jury capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before it'.").
3. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing how defendant's right to
impartial jury applies to government's prosecution).
4. See infra Part IlA (discussing how juror's criminal convictions and arrests increase
potential for bias against government).
5. See infra Part IIUA (discussing how juror's criminal conviction increases potential
for bias against government).
6. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing fact that felony conviction
almost universally disqualifies person from jury service).
7. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing effect juror's disqualifica-
tion may have on defendant's conviction).
8. See infra Part IlI (discussing why prosecutors use jurors' criminal history records in
voir dire).
9. See infra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing use of criminal history informa-
tion by prosecutors as basis for removing juror either by peremptory strike or by challenge for
cause).
10. See infra Part III (discussing implications of prosecutors' use of jurors' criminal
history records in voir dire on government's right to impartial and qualified jury); infra Part V
(discussing implications of prosecutors' use of jurors' criminal history records in voir dire on
jurors' right to informational privacy and on defendant's right to fair trial).
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in voir dire." Many state courts, as well as some federal circuit courts, have
answered the secondary question of whether the defendant has a right to
disclosure of jurors' criminal records in the prosecutor's possession.12 But
only three states - Iowa,"3 Alaska, 4 and Missouri 5 - have answered the
primary question of whether prosecutors even can use the records in voir
dire. 6 Recently, however, this question has surfaced in Virginia, where Chief
Judge James H. Chamblin of Virginia's Twentieth Judicial Circuit issued an
order prohibiting Virginia's prosecutors from engaging in the common prac-
tice of conducting criminal and driving history checks on prospective jurors."
Legal scholars also have failed to examine adequately the question of
prosecutors' use of jurors' criminal records in voir dire. Commentators
discussing information about jurors have focused almost exclusively on the
privacy rights of jurors in the context of voir dire questioning," public and
11. See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text (discussing failure of courts and legal
commentators to examine adequately question of prosecutors' use of jurors' criminal history
records in voir dire).
12. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches courts
have used to examine whether defendants have right to disclosure of jurors' criminal history
records).
13. See State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W. 2d 134, 135-38 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (conclud-
ing that state law prohibited county attorneys from obtaining rap sheets of all prospective jurors
except by virtue of court order, in which case juror's rap sheet also must be available for
defendant's use); infra Part IV.A (discussing Bessenecker).
14. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611-13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that
prosecutor's use of criminal history records in voir dire did not violate state law regulating these
records); infra Part IV.B (discussing Tagala).
15. See State v. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 112-13 (Mo. Ct App. 1991) (finding State
may use arrest records of potential jurors in voir dire); infra Part IV.C (discussing McMahan).
16. See infra Parts IVA-C (discussing Bessenecker, Tagala and McMahan). Besse-
necker, the Virginia case, does not provide a definitive answer because it currently only applies
to the 20th Judicial Circuit in Loudoun County, not to the entire Commonwealth. See infra Part
II (discussing Chief Judge Chamblin's order). The author acknowledges the possibility that
various state courts may have local rules or standing orders regarding the practice of investigat-
ing jurors' criminal histories for voir dire. However, this Note will limit its analysis to appellate
court decisions.
17. See Order at 1, In Re: Use of Jury Lists (Cir. Ct. of Loudoun County, Va., June 2,
1998) (prohibiting use of jury lists to conduct criminal history or driving record checks on
prospective jurors); infra Part ]I (discussing Chief Judge Chamblin's order and resulting
litigation).
18. See David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional Con-
straints and Policy Options, 70 TBMP. L. REv. 1, 16-19 (1997) (discussing implications on
jurors' privacy interests by invasive voir dire questioning and various attempts to limit this
questioning). See generally Michael R. Glover, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors
During Voir Dire, 70 CALiF. L. REV. 708 (1982) (discussing jurors' right to privacy and
conflicting right of parties to impartial jury in context of voir dire questioning).
USE OF JURORS' CRIMINAL HISTORYRECORDS1N VOIR DIRE 1083
press access to voir dire,19 limiting disclosure of juror identiies,20 and post-
trial interviews. One commentator briefly discusses pre-trial investigations
of jurors,' but focuses most of his attention on the use of state and private
investigators to investigate the jurors themselves, on whether the investiga-
tions affect ajuror's ability to be impartial, and on whether the opposing party
has a right to disclosure of the information that the state gains from the
investigation.' Even when commentators actually examine the use ofjurors'
criminal history records by prosecutors, they confine their analysis to the
context of discovery rules and attempt to decide whether the defendant has a
right to disclosure of jurors' criminal history records by the prosecutor. 4 Yet
the more important question of whether any use of criminal history records is
proper for voir dire purposes remains largely unanswered.
This Note examines prosecutors' use ofjurors' criminal history records
in voir dire through the prism of Chief Judge Chamblin's order. Part II
discusses the circumstances surrounding Chief Judge Chamblin's order.' Part
III discusses the two reasons why prosecutors use jurors' criminal history
records in voir dire. 6 Part IV analyzes the decisions of the courts in Iowa,
19. See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 19-24 (discussing implications on juror privacy of
conflicting rights of defendant and public to have access to voir dire questioning ofjurors). See
generally Michael P. Malak, FirstAmendment- Guarantee of Public Access to Voir Dire, 75
J. CPIM. L. & CRMINoLOGY 583 (1984) (examining Supreme Court's decision in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), regarding public access to voir dire and
problems facing trial courts in applying Press-Enterprise's standard); Jennifer Sweeney Buck-
ley, Casenote, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court: A Juror's Right to Privacy, 1985 DET.
C.L. REV. 649 (examining Press-Enterprise decision).
20. See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 25-32 (examining reasons for and problems with
recent judicial and legislative proposals for limiting access to jurors' identities). See generally
Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use ofAnonymous Juries in Crim-
inal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123 (1996) (arguing that, where feasible, use of anonymous juries
will enhance participation injury service, reliability of voir dire process, quality of jury deliber-
ations, and fairness of criminal verdicts by alleviating juror fears about safety and privacy).
21. See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 38-41 (discussing judicial and legislative attempts
to protect jurors' privacy from encroachment by post-trial publicity).
22. See id. at 33-38 (noting common practice of investigating jurors and various attempts
to protect juror privacy by limiting these investigations).
23. Id. at 37.
24. See generally Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Right ofDefense in Criminal Prosecution
to Disclosure of Prosecution Information Regarding Prospective Jurors, 86 A.L.3D 571
(1986) (discussing majority rule that defendant does not have right to discovery or disclosure
of information about jurors in prosecutors' possession); 23 AM. JUL 2D Depositions and
Discovery § 441 (1983) (same).
25. See infra Part HI (discussing situation surrounding Chief Judge Chamblin's order).
26. See infra Part III (discussing reasons why prosecutors use jurors' criminal history
records in voir dire).
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Alaska, and Missouri, giving particular attention to how all three courts
looked to their states' statutory schemes regulating criminal history records
for guidance.27 Part IV concludes with a comparison of these statutory
schemes and an analysis of the statutory scheme in Virginia.2 8
Part V examines Chief Judge Chamblin's reasons for issuing his order
prohibiting the use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire.' Part V.A
analyzes how this use ofjurors' criminal history records implicates the right
to privacy 3  Part V.B discusses the possibility of unfairness to the defendant
that may result from allowing prosecutors to use jurors' criminal history
records in voir dire.31 In conclusion, Part VI first argues that courts should
look to the statutory schemes regulating criminal history records to determine
whether the legislature has given prosecutors the authority to use jurors'
criminal history records in voir dire.32 Part VI then argues that jurors' right
to privacy is insufficient to prohibit prosecutors from using criminal history
records in voir dire.33 Finally, Part VI proposes that courts should remedy
unfairness by requiring prosecutors to disclose jurors' criminal history records
to the defendant when, as a result of special circumstances, the defendant has
a valid interest in using those records in voir dire.34
1U Chief Judge Chamblin 's Order in Loudoun County, Virginia
In Virginia, it is a common practice for the state prosecutors, formally
known as Commonwealth's Attorneys, to check the criminal records - and
even the driving records - of potential jurors in preparation for conducting
voir dire.35 However, on June 2, 1998, Chief Judge James H. Chamblin issued
27. See infra Part IVA-C (analyzing approach courts utilized inBessenecker, Tagala, and
McMahan).
28. See infra Part IV.D (comparing statutory schemes regulating criminal history records
in Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri, and analyzing similar scheme in Virginia).
29. See infra Part V (examining Chief Judge Chamblin's reasons for issuing his order).
30. See infra Part VA (discussing development of right to informational privacy and
applying this right to use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire).
31. See infra Part V.B (examining situations when allowing only prosecutor to use jurors'
criminal history records in voir dire is unfair to defendant).
32. See infra Part VI (arguing that courts should look first to statutes regulating criminal
history records to determine if legislature intended to give prosecutors authority to use jurors'
criminal history records in voir dire).
33. See infra Part VI (arguing that jurors' privacy interest in criminal history records is
not sufficient to justify prohibiting prosecutors from using these records in voir dire).
34. See infra Part VI (proposing that courts remedy unfairness by requiring prosecutors
to share jurors' criminal history records with defendant when special circumstances give
defendant valid interest in using these records).
35. SeeJudge BansJuror Background Searches, ROANOKETIMES, June 4,1998, § B, at
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an order prohibiting this practice in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in Loudoun
County.36 The issue initially arose out of a case in which the defense attorney
filed a motion petitioning the court to require the Commonwealth of Virginia
(Commonwealth) to provide the defendant with information regarding the
criminal histories of potential jurors that the prosecutor had obtained from the
Virginia Criminal Information Network (VCIN) 7 The trial judge inthat case,
Judge Thomas D. Home, questioned the propriety of conducting background
checks on potential jurors and threatened to sanction anyone who continued
the practice.38 Judge Home later retreated from this position.39
In a later case, three jurors failed to reveal their felony arrests in response
to the Commonwealth's Attorney's questioning.4" One of these three jurors
was a convicted felon.41 The defendant in that case made a motion seeking to
prohibit the Commonwealth from conducting background checks on jurors.
4 2
Judge Home subsequently asked Chief Judge Chamblin to review the matter
to determine the appropriateness of a rule limiting the practice of using jury
lists to investigate the criminal and driving records of prospective jurors.43
Less than one week later, Chief Judge Chamblin responded by issuing an
Order that detailed a new procedural rule for the Circuit Court of Loudoun
County.44 The rule prohibited the practice of using jury lists to conduct
5 (noting routine nature of accessing criminal history records of potential jurors); see also
Order, supra note 17, at2 (same).
36. See Order, supra note 17, at 1 (prohibiting use of jury lists to conduct background
checks in Circuit of Loudoun County).
37. Petition for Appeal at 4, In Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. August, 1998). VCIN is a state-
wide computer network operated by the Virginia State Police. Judge Bans Juror Background
Searches, supra note 35.
38. Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 4.
39. See id. at 4-5 (noting that Judge Home later indicated he would not interfere with
Commonwealth's Attorney in setting office policy regarding practice of conducting background
checks on potential jurors).
40. Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, to Vacate, to Stay the Court's Order Pending
an Appeal or an Application for Extraordinary Relief, or, in the Alternative, to Modify the Order
to Require That, When the Commonwealth Obtains NCIC and DMV Records ofVenirepersons,
She Shall Provide These Records to the Defendant at 9, In Re: Use of Jury Lists (Cir. Ct of
Loudoun County, Va. June, 1998).
41. Id. One juror had been convicted of being an accessory after the fact to a hate crime.
Id. Anotherjuror had been represented by the Office of the Public Defender, which was repre-
senting the defendant. Id. The third juror had two felony arrests and at least two aliases. Id.
42. Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 4.
43. Order, supra note 17, at 2.
44. See id. at 1 (issuing new rule regarding use of jury lists for Circuit of Loudoun
County). Chief Judge Chamblin based his authority to order such a rule on Virginia Code
§ 8.01-345, which he cited as granting the authority to create procedural rules necessary to
ensure that jury selection and service comports with the requirements of law. Id.
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criminal record or driver history checks of potential jurors." In a memoran-
dum attached to and incorporated by the Order, Chief Judge Chamblin pro-
vided two basic reasons for his decision: (1) to prevent the Commonwealth
from obtaining an impermissible advantage over the defendant,4 6 and (2) to
protect ajuror's right to a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in the information
available from VCIN and the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).'
The Commonwealth responded with a motion asking Chief Judge
Chamblin either to withdraw the order, to postpone its enforcement at least
until the Commonwealth had an opportunity to appeal the order, or to modify
the order to allow the background searches so long as the Commonwealth
gave the information to the defendant. 48 After taking the motion -under advise-
ment at the end ofthe hearing on June 11, 1998, and after the Commonwealth
filed another motion attempting to postpone the enforcement of the order
45. Id. Chief Judge Chamblin's order reads as follows:
[I]t is hereby ORDERED that the following procedural Rule concerning jury lists
is hereby promulgated:
No person, including any party or counsel, involved in any trial by jury in the
Circuit Court of Loudoun County shall use any list of prospective jurors to
conduct criminal record checks or driver history checks on any prospective
juror.
This Rule is effective upon entry of this order, and shall apply to all cases,
civil and criminal, now pending or hereafter filed in the Circuit Court of
Loudoun County.
Id.
46. See id. at 4-5 (stating that Commonwealth's Attorney should not be allowed to use
information in voir dire to which defendant does not have access).
47. Id. at 3, 4. Fairness to the defendant and juror privacy were the two major reasons
Chief Judge Chamblin gave for issuing his order. See Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 15
(listing fairness to defendant and juror privacy as two major reasons that Chief Judge Chamblin
gave); Judge Bans Juror Background Searches, supra note 35 (same). Thus, this Note will
focus on these two factors. Chief Judge Chamblin did mention briefly other reasons for his
order. See Order, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing reasons supporting Chief Judge Chamblin's
Order). According to Chief Judge Chamblin, the purpose of voir dire is not to put a prospective
juror on trial to see if that juror is qualified. Id. Jury questionnaires ask potential jurors, among
other things, whether they ever have been convicted of a felony. Id. These questionnaires, and
a party's opportunity during voir dire to verbally ask potential jurors the same questions, are the
mechanisms that Virginia law establishes for determining a juror's qualifications. Id. The
premise underlying this system is that a prospective juror will answer truthfully and accurately
questions asked in the jury selection process. Id. Also, the court, not the parties or counsel, has
the duty of ensuring that the jury selection process complies with the law. Id. By conducting
outside checks on the jurors' qualifications, a party or counsel "usurps needlessly" the court's
duty, exhibiting some distrust in the court's ability to fulfill its duty. Id. Because these reasons
are local in nature, this Note will not consider them in its discussion.
48. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at I (petitioning Chief
Judge Chamblin to reconsider or vacate order, or stay court order until Commonwealth filed an
appeal, or modify order to simply require Commonwealth to disclose criminal history data of
jurors to defendant).
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pending further hearings, the court issued a ruling on July 14, 1998 denying
the Commonwealth's motions.49
The Commonwealth sought relief from the Supreme Court of Virginia,
filing Petitions for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition as well as a Petition
for Appeal." In its appeal, the. Commonwealth argued that Chief Judge
Chamblin's order violated the doctrine of separation of powers by prohibiting
the Commonwealth's Attorney from accessing criminal history data for voir
dire purposes because the Legislature unambiguously had authorized that
practice.5 The Commonwealth also contended that the order interfered with
its constitutional right to secure an impartial and unbiased jury,5" that due
process did not require absolute equality between the defendant and the
prosecution,53 and that the order did not protect jurors' privacy because the
information the Commonwealth's Attorney sought was a matter of public
record and because Virginia law requires jurors to disclose this information. 4
Finally, the Commonwealth argued that the Order was overly broad because
its language did not limit its application to the state's computerized databases
but included the Commonwealth's Attorney's own files.55 The Virginia
Supreme Court rejected all three of the Commonwealth's Petitions, dismissing
the Petition for Appeal on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. 6
III. Prosecutors 'Reasons for Using Jurors' Criminal History
Records in Voir Dire
The purpose of voir dire is to protect the fairness of the trial by ensuring
an impartial jury. 7 Voir dire plays a critical role in seating an impartial jury
by exposing possible biases prospective jurors may harbor, either knowingly
or unknowingly. 8 In addition, voir dire serves as a mechanism for ensuring
49. Petition for Rehearing at 2, In Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Oct., 1998).
50. Id.
51. Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 16-17 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389
(Michie 1950)).
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 11-12.
56. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 49, at 2-3.
57. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,554(1984) (stating
"[o]ne touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact .... Voir dire examination serves
to protect that right by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of
potential jurors."); VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:14 (requiring court to question potential jurors to
determine whether they harbor bias or prejudice against either government or defendant).
58. See McDonough Power Equip., 464 U.S. at 554 (noting voir dire's role in protecting
right to impartial jury by exposing jurors' biases, both known and unknown); Rosales-Lopez
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that people who are disqualified from jury service do not serve as jurors.59
Prosecutors cite these two fundamental functions of the jury selection process
as reasons for using jurors' criminal history records in voir dire.6
A. To Ensure an Impartial Jury
In responding to Chief Judge Chamblin's order, the Commonwealth
asserted that it had a right to an impartial jury equal to the right of any defen-
dant.' The government does have a recognized right to an impartial jury.62
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right
to a trial by an impartial jury.63 Textually, this guarantee applies only to the
accused.' 4 However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
Sixth Amendment's underlying goal of jury impartiality applies with equal
force to the government's prosecution.65 Likewise, although the text of Vir-
ginia's constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury applies only to the ac-
cused, 66 the Virginia Supreme Court has placed a duty on trial courts to
determine through voir dire whether a person has a bias against either the
Commonwealth or the accused.67
The Commonwealth argued that Chief Judge Chamblin's order im-
properly interferes with its right to an impartial jury by depriving the Com-
monwealth of an invaluable resource that helps reveal potential bias.68 A
v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (stating "[v]oir dire plays a critical function" in
ensuring criminal process honors defendant's right to impartial jury).
59. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A14 (allowing court or counsel to ask any question of potential
juror relevant to that person's qualifications).
60. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 7-11 (arguing for use
of jurors' criminal records in detecting juror bias against Commonwealth and convicted felons
who are ineligible for jury service); Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 23-28 (same).
61. Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 9-10.
62. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing United States and Virginia
Supreme Court's recognition of government's right to impartial jury).
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.").
64. See id. (guaranteeing right of accused to trial by impartial jury).
65. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990) (stating "[a]lthough the [Sixth
Amendment's] guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the State, the goal it expresses
is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants: neither the defendant nor the State should
be favored"); Hayes v. State, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (stating "impartiality requires not only
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution.
Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.").
66. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (guaranteeing right of accused to trial by impartial jury).
67. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A14 (requiring trial courts to determine whether jurors can be
impartial regarding both accused and Commonwealth).
68. Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 28.
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juror convicted of a crime is likely to harbor animosity towards the govern-
ment, regardless of whether the crime was a felony or misdemeanor.69 The
potential for this animosity to ripen into a bias against the government's
case increases when the crime underlying the juror's conviction is similar to
the crime for which the defendant stands charged.7" This potential for bias
also exists in jurors who have been arrested but not convicted of a crime. 1
Simply being arrested, even if-the charge is not prosecuted, can cause a person
to lose a job,72 to incur substantial legal fees and other financial losses,73 and
to suffer mental and emotional anguish from the humiliation of the arrest
experience." A juror's criminal history record provides prosecutors with a
comprehensive list of the juror's experiences with the criminal justice
system."' This information enables prosecutors either to use a peremptory
strike to remove the juror or to question the juror further about the juror's
criminal history to establish a basis for striking the juror for cause.76 Thus,
Commonwealth's Attorneys, like other prosecutors," regard criminal history
69. See id. at 27 (arguing that people who have been arrested or convicted likely will
harbor bias against Commonwealth as result of their experience, unfairly affecting Common-
wealth's ability to obtain conviction).
70. See id. (listing various scenarios in which juror may harbor bias against Common-
wealth because of similarity between crime underlying juror's conviction and crime for which
defendant stands charged).
71. See id. (noting that potential for bias exists in jurors who have been arrested but not
convicted of crime). One of Chief Judge Chamblin's concerns about the Commonwealth
Attorney's use of VCIN records was that those records would show not only convictions but
also exposure to the criminal justice system of any kind, including unprosecuted arrests. Order,
supra note 17, at 5.
72. See Sopp v. Gehrlein, 232 F. Supp. 881,882 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (noting plaintiff's claim
in civil rights action that plaintiff's employer fired plaintiff after learning of plaintiff's arrest);
Roselle v. Acosta, No. 933532,1994 WL902990, at*1 (Mass. Super. Ct Sept 14,1994) (same).
73. See Shalna v. Bensalem Township Police Dep't, Civ. A. No. 87-1793, 1988 WL
71420, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1988) (noting that plaintiff in civil rights action had to spend
$6,500 in legal fees and lost $36,000 in compensation because of arrest and subsequent actions
by police and prosecutors).
74. See id. (noting plaintiff's claim that arrest caused discomfort and mental and emo-
tional anguish); see also Sopp, 232 F. Supp. at 882 (noting plaintiff's experience of having to
be fingerprinted as result of arrest and degrading nature of sexual crime for which police
charged plaintiff).
75. See infra note 234 and accompanying text (listing types of information contained in
criminal history records).
76. Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 28.
77. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611 & n.4 (Alaska Ct App. 1991) (concluding
juror's criminal records are relevant to prosecutor's use of challenges for cause, which prosecu-
tors can base on fact that challenging party has accused person in criminal prosecution in
previous two years according to Alaska Crim. Rule 24(c)(11)(ii)); State v. Bessenecker, 404
N.W. 2d 134, 135 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (noting parties' stipulation that county attorney used
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records as an invaluable tool in protecting the government's right to an
impartial jury.8
B. To Ensure a Qualified Jury
In addition to ensuring an impartial jury, voir dire provides a mechanism
for the parties or the court to remove potential jurors who are ineligible for
jury service regardless of their ability to be impartial. 9 In Virginia, a felony
conviction disqualifies a person from serving on a jury unless the state has
restored that person's civil rights.80 This rule is not unique to Virginia;
criminal convictions of some form almost universally disqualify a person from
jury service.8
criminal history data to remove jurors from panel for potential bias against State); State v.
Jackson, 450 So. 2d 621, 628 (La. 1984) (stating that criminal records ofjurors may be useful
to State in challenging jurors with bias against State).
78. See Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 28 (arguing that Chief Judge Chamblin's
order improperly interferes with Commonwealth's right to impartial jury by prohibiting Com-
monwealth's use of resource that is helpful in discovering juror bias).
79. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A-14 (allowing court or counsel to ask any question of potential
juror relevant to that person's qualifications).
80. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (lchie 1950).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1994) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of
or facing pending charges for crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and
civil rights have not been restored); ALA. CODE § 12-16-60 (1975) (disqualifying person from
jury service if convicted for crime involving moral turpitude); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020
(Michie 1994) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony without uncondi-
tional discharge); AaRz. REv. STAT. § 21-201 (1990) (disqualifying person from jury service if
convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102
(Michie 1987) (disqualifying person from jury service if has been convicted of felony and has
not been pardoned); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West Supp. 1999) (disqualifying person from
jury service if convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 51-217 (West 1985) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony
within last seven years, or currently facing pending felony charges, or currently in custody of
Commissioner of Correction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 4509 (1974) (disqualifying person
from jury service if convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1906 (1995) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless civil
rights have been restored or if currently facing pending felony or misdemeanor charges); FLA.
STAT. § 40.013 (1998) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless civil
rights have been restored); GA. CODEANN. § 15-12-163 (1994) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-
4 (1993) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless pardoned); IDAHO
CODE § 2-209 (1998) (disqualifying person from jury service if ineligible to vote because of
criminal conviction); IND. CODE § 33-4-5-7 (1998) (disqualifying person from jury service if
convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-158 (1993)
(disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony within previous ten years); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 29A.080 (Banks-Baldwin 1992) (disqualifying person from jury service if
convicted of felony unless pardoned); LA. CODE CRIMI PROC. ANN. art. 401 (West 1991)
(disqualifying person from jury service if under indictment for or convicted of felony unless
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pardoned); MD. CoDEANN., CTS. & JUD. PROc. § 8-207 (1998) (disqualifying person fromjury
service if charged with or convicted of crime punishable by fine of more than $500 or imprison-
ment for more than six months, or both, unless pardoned); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 4
(1986) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony within last seven years, or
currently facing pending felony charges, or currently in custody of correctional institution);
MicE. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.1307a (West 1996) (disqualifying person from jury service if
under sentence for felony conviction at time ofjury selection); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02, Subd.
5 (listing felony conviction as valid challenge for cause unless juror's civil rights have been
restored); Miss. CoDEANN. § 13-5-1 (1972) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted
of infamous crime); Mo. REv. STAT. § 494.425 (1996) (disqualifying person from jury service
if convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-303
(1997) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony or other high crime); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1995) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of crime
punishable by imprisonment in adult correctional facility); NEV. RLV. STAT. § 6.010 (1997)
(disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony or other infamous crime); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 500-.A7-a (Supp. 1998) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted
of felony which has not been annulled); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1 (West 1999 Pamphlet)
(disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of indictable offense under any state or
federal law); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1 (Michie 1998) (disqualifying person from jury service
if convicted of felony); N.Y. JuD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1992) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3
(1986) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless citizenship has been
restored); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-08 (1991) (disqualifying person from jury service who
has lost right to vote due to imprisonment in penitentiary or conviction of crime that by law
disqualifies person); OE1lO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42 (West 1994) (providing that conviction
of crime that disqualifies person from jury service is good cause for challenging that person as
juror); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (West 1999) (disqualifying person from jury service if
convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030 (1997)
(disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony within prior 15 years); 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4502 (West 1981) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year unless pardoned); R.L GEN. LAWS § 9-
9-1.1 (1997) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless sentence and
probation or parole have been completed); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-810 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than one year unless pardoned); S.D. CODn=ID LAWS § 16-13-10 (Michie 1995) (disquali-
fying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless civil rights have been restored);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-102 (1994) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of
infamous crimes or crimes of theft, perjury, or subordination of perjury); TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 62.102 (West 1998) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony or
legally accused of felony or crime of theft); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-7 (1996) (disqualifying
person from jury service if convicted of felony unless expunged); VT. R. JURY SELECT 25
(disqualifying person from jury who has been imprisoned for felony conviction); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.36.070 (West 1988) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of
felony unless civil rights have been restored); W.VA. CODE § 52-1-8 (1994) (disqualifying
person from jury service who has lost right to vote because of criminal conviction or has been
convicted of perjury, false swearing, or other infamous crime); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 756.02 (West
1981) (disqualifying person from jury service if convicted of felony unless civil rights have been
restored); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-102 (Michie 1997) (same). Butsee COLO. REV. STAT.ANN.
§ 13-71-105 (West 1997) (listing qualifications of jurors without reference to juror's criminal
history); 705 ILL. COMe. STAT. 305/2 (West 1992) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607A.4 (West
1996) (same); ME. RE v. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 1211 (West 1980) (same).
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Prior to the issuance of Chief Judge Chamblin's order, the Common-
wealth's Attorney for Loudoun County issued a policy statement declaring
that his office conducted criminal and driving background checks of potential
jurors- in order to ensure that convicted felons did not serve as jurors.8 2 The
Commonwealth responded to the order by asserting an interest in removing
convicted felons and other legally disqualified people from the jury.83 This
interest arises from the possibility that a court could overturn a defendant's
conviction upon a showing that the presence of an unqualified juror "probably
caused him injustice."84 This concern is even more acute for federal prosecu-
tors because a defendant in a federal case only needs to show that a juror
failed to answer accurately a material question that, if answered correctly,
would have been a valid basis for a challenge for cause." Discovering that a
juror was a convicted felon would be a valid challenge for cause and thus
could lead to the defendant receiving a new trial.8 6
The inability to use jurors' criminal records forces the courts and the
litigants to rely on jurors to answer jury questionnaires and voir dire questions
accurately. But, as the Commonwealth pointed out, self-reporting is not
always an effective means of discovering prior felony convictions.' Neither
the prohibition of convicted felons from voting 8 nor from purchasing fire-
arms" is enough to prevent felons from denying their prior convictions, even
though these denials are crimes themselves.' ° Virginia's prosecutors routinely
82. Order, supra note 17, at 2.
83. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 2 n.2 (giving reasons
why Commonwealth has interest in ensuring only qualified people serve as jurors).
84. Id. (citing Mighty v. Commonwealth, 438 S.E.2d 495,496 (Va. Ct App. 1993) and
listing various ways presence of convicted felon on jury could probably cause injustice against
defendant).
85. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,556 (1984) (giving
two-part test for granting defendant new trial because of juror's mistaken, although honest,
answer to voir dire question).
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1994) (making conviction of crime punishable by more than
one year disqualification from jury service); United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 67 (2d. Cir.
1993) (noting that felony conviction is automatic disqualification from jury service).
87. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 9 (noting that felons
commonly violate law by denying felony conviction in order to serve as jurors, purchase
firearms, or register to vote).
88. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (disqualifuing convicted felons from voting unless civil
rights have been restored).
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Michie 1950) (prohibiting convicted felons from
possessing firearms).
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1016 (Michie 1950) (making person who willfully gives
false material statement on voter registration application guilty of Class-5 felony of election
fraud); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-418 (Michie 1950) (requiring applicant for voter registration to
disclose whether applicant has ever been convicted of felony); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2
(Michie 1950) (making false material statement given willfully and intentionally on consent
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encounter and prosecute convicted felons for unlawfully acquiring firearms,
and the Office of Voter Registration routinely confronts convicted felons who
attempt to register to vote.9' The same is true ofthe prohibition of felons from
serving on juries as well; background checks periodically reveal jurors with
felony convictions.'
At least one state legislature has recognized the utility of checking jurors'
criminal histories as a means of ensuring a qualified jury. Massachusetts
explicitly provides courts, jury commissioners, and court clerks with the
authority to check jurors' criminal history records for the limited purpose of
ensuring that the jurors are qualified.' Although a system like Massachu-
setts's addresses the prosecutor's fears that convicted felons may be sitting on
juries, it fails to uncover jurors who are otherwise qualified but harbor a bias
against the government.
Virginia law permits a party to present "any competent evidence" to
support an objection to a juror, regardless of whether it is based on bias or
disqualification.94 From the prosecutor's perspective, a juror's criminal
history record is competent evidence, if not the most competent evidence, to
show a juror's impartiality and disqualification.95 The question then becomes
whether the laws regulating criminal history records allow prosecutors to
make use of these records in voir dire.
IV Judicial Precedent: Courts Look to the Statutory Schemes
Regulating Criminal History Records for the Answer
Although Chief Judge Chamblin did not have the benefit of Virginia
precedent discussing whether prosecutors could use jurors' criminal history
records while conducting voir dire, courts in Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri have
addressed this issue. 6 In each case, the courts looked to the statutory schemes
regulating the use of criminal history records to find the answer. Although
form required for purchase of firearm punishable as Class-5 felony, requiring consent form to
solicit information from purchaser identical to information required by firearms transaction
record required by Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of U.S. Department of Treasury);
27 C.F.R. § 178.124 (requiring firearms transaction record to include signature that seller has
no reason to believe that buyer is legally prohibited from receiving firearm to be sold).
91. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-308.
92. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 8-9 (discussing how
background checks on jurors' criminal histories have revealed convicted felons among jury panel).
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 33 (1986).
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Michie 1950) (stating that "party objecting to any
juror may introduce any competent evidence in support of the objection").
95. See Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 19-21 (arguing that juror's criminal and
driving records clearly are competent evidence within meaning of Virginia Code § 8.01-358).
96. See infra Parts IVA-C (discussing decisions of Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri courts).
97. See infra Parts IV.A-C (discussing decisions of Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri courts).
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the statutory provisions of these three states are quite similar,98 the three
courts arrived at two different conclusions."
A. The Supreme Court of Iowa - State v. Bessenecker
In State v. Bessenecker ° the Supreme Court of Iowa became the first
state appellate court to decide whether prosecutors could use jurors' criminal
records in voir dire. 01 In Bessenecker, the defendant challenged the county
attorney's practice of using the rap sheets of all potential jurors during voir
dire. 2 The defendant argued that this practice violated the statutes regulating
the use and the dissemination of criminal history records because investigating
jurors is not one of the county attorney's prescribed duties underthe statutes.0 3
The court observed that although none of the statutorily prescribed duties
of the county attorney explicitly included investigating jurors' criminal
histories,"' the county attorney did have the express duty to prosecute viola-
98. See infra Part IV.D (comparing statutory provisions of Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri).
99. See infra Parts IV.A-C (discussing decisions of Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri courts).
100. 404 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 1987).
101. See State v. Bessenecker, 404N.W. 2d 134, 135-38 (Iowa 1987) (en banc) (conclud-
ing that state law prohibited county attorneys from obtaining rap sheets of all prospective jurors
except when obtained by court order, in which case county attorney must makejuror's rap sheet
available to defendant). In Bessenecker, the defendant, charged with second-degree theft,
challenged the county attorney's proposed use of all the prospective jurors' rap sheets during
voir dire. Id. at 135. The trial court sided with the State in concluding that this use of criminal
history data did not violate § 692.2(3)(a), which governed the dissemination and use of criminal
history data. Id. at 136. The court, in overruling the trial court's decision, took note of Chapter
692's cautious tone indicating a legislative purpose to protect the individual against unwar-
ranted circulation of his or her rap sheet. Id at 137. The court concluded that the objectives
of Chapter 692 dictated an interpretation of § 692.2(3)(a) that precluded the county attorney
from obtaining jurors' rap sheets. Id at 138. The court did create a caveat: The county
attorney can obtain a court order to access the criminal records of a juror "when there is a
reasonable basis for believing that the rap sheet may contain information that is pertinent to the
individual's selection as ajuror and that is unlikely to be disclosed through voir dire or through
juror questionnaires." Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to state explicitly that it agreed
with the reasoning of various jurisdictions that have held that fairness requires that the defen-
dant have equal access to ajuror's rap sheet when the county attorney obtains it. Id. at 138-39.
102. Id. at 135.
103. Id. at 136. Atthetime ofBessenecker, Iowa law limited the dissemination of criminal
history records to "criminal justice agencies" for "official purposes in connection with pre-
scribed duties." IOWA CODE § 692.2(1)(a), (3)(a) (1993). This is no longer true under Iowa
law. See IowACODE § 692.2 (Supp. 1999) (lacking language limiting dissemination of criminal
history records to criminal justice agencies for only "official purposes in connection with
prescribed duties"). However, for purposes of analysis, this Note will refer to the law regarding
the dissemination of criminal history records that was in force in Iowa at the time of the
Bessenecker decision.
104. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d at 136 (citing IOWA CODE § 331.756 (1993), which lists
duties of county attorney).
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tions of state law and the implied duty to do so competently. 5 Attorneys also
investigated jurors as part of a recognized practice to gather information that
would aid in the intelligent use of voir dire objections tojurors."° In fact, so
long as the jurors were not aware of these investigations, they were accept-
able."0 7 However, the court did not believe that performing an implied duty
or following a common practice was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
§ 692.2(3)(a),10 8 which limits the use of criminal history records to the perfor-
mance of a prescribed duty."°
The court recognized a legislative purpose to protect individuals froni
unwarranted circulation of their rap sheets, as evidenced by the cautious tone
of the statutory scheme regulating criminal history records."1 Accordingly,
an interpretation of § 692.2(3)(a) precluding the county attorney from acquir-
ing the rap sheets of all potential jurors would best fulfill that legislative
purpose.' The court also noted that jury questionnaires and individual voir
dire questioning provided the same information.' 2 Thus, the county attorney
did not have an overwhelming need to obtain jurors' rap sheets.1 However,
the court created a caveat allowing the county attorney to access the criminal
history information of an individual juror by court order if the county attorney
could show a reasonable basis for believing that the rap sheet might contain
information pertinent to selecting the individual as a juror that voir dire or
juror questionnaires were unlikely to disclose."4 The court also held that if
the county attorney obtains ajuror's rap sheet by court order, fairness requires
that the county attorney give the information to the defendant unless the
county attorney can show good cause to the contrary."'
Threejudges dissented inBessenecker.16 They agreed that the defendant
should have equal access to criminal history data that the county attorney uses
during voir dire." 7 The dissenters, however, argued that requiring the county
attorney to obtain a court order to acquire a juror's criminal history records
105. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 331.756(1) (1993)).
106. Id.
107. Id. atn.1.
108. See id (distinguishing "performing an implied duty or following a common practice"
from "complying with an authoritative rule or direction").
109. Seesupra note 103 (quoting languageof§ 692.2(3)(a)); infranotes 156-59 and accom-
panying text (examining provisions of Iowa Code regulating use of criminal history records).
110. State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1987) (en banc).
111. Id. at 138.
112. I at 137.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 138.
115. Id. at 139.
116. Id
117. Id (Wolle, J., dissenting).
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was both a misinterpretation ofthe relevant statutes and impractical."' They
argued that selecting a qualified and competent jury free from bias or preju-
dice was a part of the county attorney's statutorily-prescribed duty to prose-
cute violations of the law."9 Thus, § 692.2(3)(a) authorized the use of crimi-
nal history records as a tool of voir dire.'2 The dissenters argued that al-
though the statute did not provide explicitly for investigations ofjurors' crim-
inal backgrounds, the public and the courts certainly expect a county attorney
to perform that task.121
The dissent concluded by highlighting the impracticality ofthe majority's
special-case rule: Without prior access to a juror's criminal history, a prose-
cutor will struggle to make the showing necessary to obtain a court order.
122
When a juror is a complete stranger, the prosecutor usually will not have a
reason to believe that the juror's criminal record contains pertinent informa-
tion that is not likely to be disclosed during voir dire." A prosecutor most
needs a juror's rap sheet when the prosecutor does not have a reasonable basis
to suspect the contents of a juror's criminal record. 24
B. The Court ofAppeals ofAlaska'" - Tagala v. State
Four years after Bessenecker, Tagala v. State 26 raised the question of
whether prosecutors could use jurors' criminal records in voir dire before the
Court ofAppeals ofAlaska.' 2' In Tagala, the defendant challenged his convic-
118. See id. at 139-40 (Wolle, J., dissenting) (dissenting on grounds that there is no statu-
tory basis for majority's prohibition of use of juror's criminal history data except in "special
cases involving individual jurors" and that this special case rule is impractical).
119. Id. at 140 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Wolle, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Wolle, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Wolle, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Wolle, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Wolle, J., dissenting).
125. The Court of Appeals is Alaska's intermediate court of appeals, having appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the trial courts subject to the review of the Alaska Supreme Court.
See ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020 (Michie 1998) (establishing Court of Appeals' jurisdiction).
126. 812 P.2d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
127. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611-13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that
prosecutor's use of criminal history records in voir dire did not violate state laws regulating
these records). In Tagala, the defendant challenged his conviction for first degree murder on
numerous grounds, one of which was the State's use of the computerized criminal records
system to conduct criminal background checks on at least twenty-six jurors. Id. at 611. Relying
on the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bessenecker, the defendant claimed that the
prosecutor's actions violated the statute that governed the use of the state's computer system
and the access, use, and dissemination of criminal justice information. Id. The statute limited
dissimenation of criminal justice information to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement
purposes. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.030(a) (repealed 1994)). The defendant argued that
voir dire was not a proper law enforcement purpose because it did not involve crime prevention
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tions for first-degree murder and tampering with physical evidence, claiming
that it was unlawful for the state to use its computer system to conduct criminal
background checks on potential jurors."as Like the defendant in Bessenecker,
the defendant in Tagala argued-thatvoir dire was not an authorized use of crim-
inal history records because voir dire was not a law enforcement purpose as
required by Alaska Statutes § 12.62.030(a).'" The defendant also citedBesse-
neckerin arguingthatthewhole statutoryscheme demonstrated a concermto pro-
tect the privacy and security of private citizens including prospective jurors."'
The Statearguedthatvoir dire constituted alawfulpurposeunder § 12.62.030(a)
because Alaska Criminal Rule 24(c)(1 1)(ii) permitted challenges ofjurors who
have been the subject of a prior criminal prosecution, and the law allowed the
State to obtain the information necessary to make those challenges.' 31
After noting that the practice of conducting criminal background checks
on potential jurors by prosecutors was common in Alaska as well as in other
states, 132 the court quickly dispatched with the defendant's statutory argu-
ment.1 33 At the time of Tagala, Alaska law defined "law enforcement purpose"
to include "activities of criminal prosecution.' 134 Therefore, because jurors'
criminal records are relevant to challenging jurors for cause, the prosecutor did
notviolate § 12.62.030(a).135 The court also requiredthe prosecutor to disclose
to the defendant, upon request, the results of background checks done on
prospective jurors. 136 To do otherwise would place "a premium on 'gamesman-
ship' to the subversion of the trial's search for truth."'137 However, the court
or control. Id. However, the statutory definition of law enforcement expressly includes "activ-
ities of criminal prosecution." Id. at 612 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.070(6) (repealed
1994)). The court then concluded that because criminal records of jurors are relevant for the
use of challenges for cause, the prosecutor in Tagala's ease did not violate state law. Id. The
court went on to declare that fundamental fairness requires disclosure of juror's criminal record
to the defendant Id. According to the court, to do otherwise "places a premium on 'gamesman-
ship' to the subversion of the trial's search for truth." Id.
128. Id. at 611. After questioning by defense counsel, the prosecutor admitted that the
police had obtained printouts of the criminal histories of "at least twenty-six prospective jurors"
and shared the information with her. Id.
129. Id. Alaska law at the time of Tagala limited the access to and use of criminal history
records to "law enforcement agencies ... for law enforcement purposes." ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.62.030(a) (repealed 1994).




134. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.070(6) (repealed 1994)).
135. See id. (referring to provision of § 12.62.030(a) limiting use of criminal history
records to "law enforcement purposes").
136. Id.
137. Id.
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qualified its conclusions by stating that the opinion should not necessarily be
the final word regarding a prosecutor's use ofjurors' criminal records and by
suggesting that the criminal rules committee address the issue."'
C. The Missouri Court ofAppeals139 - State v. McMahan
Less than a year after Tagala, Missouri joined Alaska in validating the
prosecutorial practice of investigating the criminal histories of potential
jurors. 40 In State v. McMahan, 4' the Missouri Court of Appeals had to
decide whether Missouri law prohibited prosecutors from using the arrest
records of prospective jurors during voir dire.'42 The defendant in McMahan
claimed that the State's use ofjurors' arrest records in voir dire violated the
laws governing the access to and use of these records." The defendant also
claimed that this use ofjurors' arrest records gave the State an unfair advan-
tage in voir dire. " This argument foreshadows some of the reasoning under-
lying Chief Judge Chamblin's order.145
Like the courts of Iowa'46 and Alaska,'47 the Missouri court looked to the
138. Id. at 613 n.6.
139. The Missouri Court of Appeals is Missouri's intermediate-level court with general
appellate jurisdiction. See Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3 (establishing court of appeals and
granting general appellate jurisdiction in all cases except those within exclusive jurisdiction of
Missouri Supreme Court).
140. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Alaska's decision allowing prosecutors to usejurors'
criminal history records in voir dire).
141. 821 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
142. See State v. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating defen-
dant's argument that State violated laws by accessing jurors' arrest records for voir dire). In
McMahan, the defendant claimed the State's use ofjurors' arrest records violated Missouri law
governing those records and gave the State an unfair advantage injury selection. Id. The court
consulted the relevant statutes and noted that § 610.120 expressly provides that the courts and
law enforcement agencies can use the arrest records in prosecution. Id. at 113. Because the
statute granted the State the authority to use the arrest records for purposes of prosecution, the
court dismissed the defendant's claim without examining whether the arrest records gave the
State an unfair advantage. Id.
143. Id. Missouri law limits the access to and use of arrest records to "law enforcement
agencies.., for purposes of prosecution." Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.120(1) (1986).
144. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d at 112.
145. See infra Part V.B (discussing Chief Judge Chamblin's concern that allowing Com-
monwealth's Attorney to use jurors' criminal history records in voir dire would put defendant
at unfair disadvantage).
146. See Statev. Bessenecker, 404N.W.2d 134,136-38 (Iowa 1987) (en banc) (examining
provisions of Iowa Code § 692, which regulates criminal history records); supra notes 104-111
and accompanying text (discussing Iowa Supreme Court's focus on statutes regulating criminal
history records).
147. See Tagalav. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611 (AlaskaCt. App. 1991) (examining provisions
of ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.030(a), which regulates criminal history records); supra notes 134-35
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statutes governing the access and use of arrest records to decide if the State
had the authorityto use arrest records during voir dire. 4 ' TheMcMahan court
wasted little time in determining that the State's use ofjurors' arrest records
did not violate Missouri law. 149 The law limiting access to and use of these
arrest records specifically exempted courts and law enforcement agencies
when they use the records for purposes of prosecution.150 Thus, the court
reasoned that because the statute did not limit the use of arrest records to the
prosecution of the arrestee, it fully authorized the State to use the arrest
records of potential jurors in voir dire.'5 ' The court simply ignored the defen-
dant's claim that the State had an unfair advantage in voir dire as a result of
having access to jurors' arrest records.' In a later decision, the Missouri
Court of Appeals examined the claim of unfair advantage and concluded that
absent a statutory provision to the contrary, defendants have no right to
disclosure of jurors' arrest records. 53
D. Comparison and Analysis of the Statutory Schemes Regulating
Jurors' Criminal History Records
1. Comparing the Statutory Schemes in Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri
The courts in Bessenecker, Tagala, and McMahan examined the relevant
statutes governing the use and dissemination of criminal history records to
determine whether the prosecutors had the authority to use those records in
voir dire.'54 The statutes that these courts examined all contained similar
provisions allowing prosecutors to use criminal history records for purposes
and accompanying text (discussing Alaska Court of Appeals's focus on statutes regulating
criminal history records).
148. See State v. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 112-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (examining
provisions of Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 610.100,610.120 (1986).
149. See id. (concluding prosecutor's use ofjurors' arrest records did not violate Missouri
law).
150. Id. at 113 (quoting Mo. RLrV. STAT. § 610.120 (1986)).
151. Id.
152. See id. (dismissing defendant's claim without analyzing whether State's use ofjurors'
arrest records gave State unfair advantage in voir dire).
153. See State v. White, 909 S.W.2d 391,394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (deciding that statutes
do not obligate prosecutor to disclose jurors' arrest records to defendant because statutes do not
require such disclosure and defendant has no general right to discovery outside of statutory
provisions).
154. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611-12 (Alaska CL App. 1991) (examining
ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.030(a) (repealed 1994), which governs dissemination of criminal history
records); State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 135-38 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (examining
IOWA CODE § 692.2 (1993), which governs dissemination of criminal history records); State v.
McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 112-13 (Mo. CL App. 1991) (examining Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 610.100,610.120 (1986), which govern dissemination of arrest records).
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of prosecution."' 5 In Iowa, the relevant provisions of § 692.2 of the Iowa
Code limit access to criminal history records to "criminal justice agencies ...
for official purposes in connection withprescribed duties.' 511 6 Section 692.1(7)
defines a criminal justice agency to include a government agency whose
principal function is the prosecution of criminal offenders. 57 Because the
principal function of Iowa's county attorneys is to prosecute -violations of the
law, this definition necessarily includes prosecutors.' Therefore, in Iowa,
prosecutors can use criminal history records for purposes of prosecution.'5 9
At the time of the Tagala decision, Alaska Statute § 12.62.030(a) limited
access to and use of criminal history records to "law enforcement agencies...
for law enforcement purposes.""1cc Section 12.62.070 defined a law enforce-
ment agency as a "public agency" whose principal function is "activities
pertaining to law enforcement."'' The legislature defined law enforcement
as "any activity relating to... the enforcement of criminal law, including, but
not limited to... activities of criminal prosecution."' 62 Therefore, as a public
agency whose function is to prosecute criminal offenses, 63 a prosecutor can
use criminal history records for any activity relating to criminal prosecu-
tions."M
155. Compare infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (examining provisions of Iowa
Code regulating access to and use of criminal history records), with infra notes 160-64 and
accompanying text (examining provisions of Alaska Statutes regulating access to and use of
criminal history records), and infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text (examining provisions
of Missouri Revised Statutes regulating access to and use of arrest records).
156. IOWA CODE § 692.2(1)(a), (3)(a) (1993).
157. Id. § 692.1(7).
158. See id. § 331.756(1) (listing county attorney's duty to prosecute violations of law
first).
159. See id. § 692.2(3)(a) (allowing use of criminal history records for "official purposes
in connection with prescribed duties").
160. ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.030(a) (repealed 1994).
161. Id. § 12.62.070(7) (repealed 1994).
162. Id. § 12.62.070(6) (repealed 1994).
163. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611-12 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (accepting
prosecutor as "law enforcement agency" without comment). Unlike Iowa, Alaska does not
provide a comprehensive list of duties for its local prosecutors. However, Alaska law does
provide a list of duties for its Attomey General, which includes the duty to "prosecute all cases
involving violation of state law." ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020(bX3) (Michie 1996). The Alaska
Attorney General has stated that local prosecutors are "subordinates" of the Attorney General.
1985 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. 61 (1985), available in 1985 WL 70137, at *4. Thus, itis reason-
able to conclude that the function of prosecutors is to prosecute criminal offenses, in light of
the prosecutor's position as a subordinate of the Attorney General and the court's tacit approval
of this conclusion in Tagala.
164. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.62.030(a), 12.62.070(6) (repealed 1994) (allowing use of
criminal history records for "law enforcement purposes," which include activities of prosecu-
tion).
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In Missouri, Missouri Revised Statutes § 610.100 mandates the closure
of certain arrest records"65 and specifically states that the exceptions to closure
listed in § 610.120 apply to these arrest records."' Section 610.120 provides
that "law enforcement agencies" can access closed records "for purposes of
prosecution." 67 Although the Missouri legislature did not see fit to define
explicitly "law enforcement agencies" as the Alaska legislature had,168 the
Missouri legislature's inclusion of "purposes of prosecution" indicates an
intent to include prosecutors within the exception provided for "law enforce-
ment agencies." '169 Thus, Missouri's statutory scheme allows prosecutors to
use arrest records for the purpose of prosecution.
170
Despite the similarity ofthe statutory schemes of Iowa, Alaska, and Mis-
souri, the Alaska Court of Appeals and the Missouri Court of Appeals reached
a different conclusion than did the Iowa Supreme Court as to whether the
respective statutory scheme allowed prosecutors to use criminal history records
in voir dire.17' The question that caused this disagreement was whether the
165. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.100(2) (1988) (providing that arrest records are "closed
records" if state failed to charge person arrested with criminal offense within thirty days of
arrest). Although the Missouri legislature has amended the language of § 610.100 since the
McMahan decision, the substantive provisions remain the same. Compare State v. McMahan,
821 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting § 610.100), with Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 610.100(2) (1988).
166. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.100(2) (1988).
167. Id. § 610.120(1).
168. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing how Alaska Statutes
defined "law enforcement agencies" and "law enforcement purposes" to include activities of
prosecutor).
169. See McMahan, 821 S.W.2d at 113 (citing exception for law enforcement agencies for
purposes of prosecution as reason for concluding statute allowed State to use closed arrest
records ofjurors in voir dire). But cf Mo. REV. STAT. § 589.417(1) (1988) (listing prosecutors
and law enforcement agencies separately). Although § 589.417(1) does list prosecutors as
separate from law enforcement agencies, it does so in the context of providing that only
prosecutors, courts, and law enforcement agencies shall have access to the described records,
which the statute explicitly provides are not public records. Id. Thus, if the legislature deemed
prosecutors worthy of such exclusive access, along with courts and law enforcement agencies,
to the records which § 589.417(1) describes, it is reasonable to infer the same legislative intent
with respect to closed arrest records, particularly in light of the fact the legislature included
"prosecution" as a proper use of these closed arrest records.
170. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.120(1) (1988) (allowing access to and use of closed arrest
records for "purposes of prosecution").
171. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 612 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (allowing prosecutors
to use criminal history records in voir dire); State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa
1987) (en bane) (prohibiting prosecutors from using criminal history records in voir dire); State
v. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing prosecutors to use arrest
records in voir dire); supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing Bessenecker decision);
supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing Tagala decision); supra note 150 and
accompanying text (discussing McMahan decision).
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statutes considered voir dire a proper purpose of prosecution." 2  Both the
Alaska Court of Appeals and the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that
prosecutors could use criminal history records in voir dire because they could
use the records for prosecution purposes; neither court believed that it was
necessary to examine the precise relationship between conducting voir dire
and prosecuting criminal cases."' In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court
decided that conducting voir dire merely f'ulflled an implied duty of the
prosecutor and was not within the prosecutor's prescribed dutyto prosecute." 4
Therefore, prosecutors could not use criminal history records in voir dire
because voir dire, as an implied duty, was not sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of § 692.2(3)(a).
175
The Iowa Supreme Court's conclusion is debatable for two reasons.
First, the court recognized that a prosecutor's express duty to prosecute
included an implied duty to do so competently.176 The court also viewed voir
dire as fulfilling this implied duty of competence. 177 The nexus between an
express duty and its included implied duties could be seen as sufficient to
satisfy the broad language of § 692.2(3)(a) - "for official purposes in connec-
tion with prescribed duties.llT7 Second, a juror's felony conviction is a valid
basis for challenging that juror for cause in Iowa.179 The Court of Appeals of
Alaska in Tagala looked to a similar provision in Alaska's Criminal Rules as
172. Compare supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska Court of
Appeals's conclusion that voir dire was activity of prosecution), and supra notes 149-50 and
accompanying text (discussing Missouri Court of Appeals's conclusion that voir dire was activ-
ity of prosecution), with supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa Supreme
Court's analysis and conclusion that voir dire did not fall within prescribed duty of county
attorney to prosecute violations of law).
173. See Tagala, 812 P.2d at 113 (concluding prosecutor could use criminal history
records in voir dire because statute defined "law enforcement purpose" to include "activities of
criminal prosecution" without discussing whether voir dire should be considered activity of
prosecution); McMahan, 821 S.W.2d at 113 (concluding prosecutor could use arrest records in
voir dire because statute included "purposes of prosecution" within allowable uses of arrest
records without discussing whether voir dire should be considered purpose of prosecution).
174. See Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d at 136 (concluding intelligent use of challenges merely
fulfills implied duty of prosecutor to prosecute competently, but is not part of prescribed duty
to prosecute).
175. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa Supreme Court's
analysis in Bessenecker of connection between voir dire and county attorney's express duty to
prosecute violations of law); supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing language of
§ 692.2(3Xa)).
176. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa Supreme Court's charac-
terization of relationship between duty to prosecute and duty to prosecute competently).
177. See State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (discussing
voir dire activity as performing implied duty of competence).
178. IowA CODE § 692.2(3Xa) (1993) (emphasis added).
179. IOWAR. CRIM P. 17(5)(a).
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a basis for allowing prosecutors to use jurors' criminal history records in voir
dire.180
2. Analyzing the Statutory Scheme in Virginia
Virginia's statutory scheme is quite similar to those in Iowa, Alaska, and
Missouri.s' However, Chief Judge Chamblin's lack of attention to that
statutory scheme stands in stark contrast to the statutory analysis that the
courts undertook in Bessenecker, Tagala, and McMahan. s2 In its response to
Chief Judge Chamblin's order, the Commonwealth of Virginia grounded its
argument that Virginia law gives the Commonwealth the authority to use
criminal history data during voir dire 3 on Virginia Code § 19.2-389, which
governs the dissemination of criminal history data."4 Section 19.2-389(A)(1)
provides that criminal history data can be disseminated to "criminal justice
agencies... for the purposes of the administration of criminal justice."'8 5
Similar to the Alaska statute, 8 6 the Virginia statute clarifies its intent by
defining the keyterms of § 19.2-389(A)(1).'" Section 9-169 defines criminal
180. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska Court ofAppeals's
reasoning in Tagala that prosecutors could use jurors' criminal history records in voir dire
because they were relevant to use of challenges for cause).
181. Compare supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text (discussing statutory schemes
in Iowa, Alaska, and Missouri), with infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory scheme in Virginia).
182. Comparesupranotes 104-11,133-34,149-50 and accompanying text (discussing statu-
tory analysis used by courts in Bessenecker, Tagala, and McMahan, respectively), with Order,
supra note 17 (prohibiting use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire without discussing
whether statutes regulating criminal history records allow use ofthese records in voir dire).
183. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 1-3 (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-389(AX3) (Mlchie 1950)). The Commonwealth later amended its argument,
choosing instead to rely on § 19.2-389(AX1). Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 16.
Apparently, the Commonwealth changed its argument because it more accurately applies to the
Commonwealth Attorney's use of criminal history data as a "criminal justice agency." Compare
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389(AX1) (Michie 1950) (applying directly to use of criminal history
data by "criminal justice agency ... for purposes of the administration of criminal justice"), with
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389(AX3) (Michie 1950) (applying to use of criminal history data by
"individuals or agencies pursuant to a specific agreement with a criminal justice agency to
provide services required for the administration of criminal justice"). For this reason, this
Note's statutory analysis will focus on §19.2-389(AX1).
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389 (Michie 1950) (regulating dissemination of criminal
history data).
185. Id. § 19.2-389(AXI).
186. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska legislature's
definitions of key terms ofALASKA STAT. § 12.62.030(a) (repealed 1994)).
187. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-169(3) (Mlchie 1950) (defining criminajustice agency as "a
court or any other governmental agency or subunit thereof which as its principal function
performs the administration of criminal justice").
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justice agencies as agencies whose "principal function" is the "administration
of criminal justice."'88 The Virginia statute's definition of 'The administration
of criminal justice" closely resembles the language of Alaska's definition of
"law enforcement."'189 Virginia defines the administration of criminal justice
as the "performance of any activity directly involving the... prosecution...
of accused persons or criminal offenders."'" Therefore, because the principal
function of the Commonwealth's Attorney is to prosecute crimes, 9 the Com-
monwealth's Attorney is a criminal justice agency."9 Conducting voir dire
appears to fit under the broad definition of "administration of criminal justice"
because a jury trial necessitates the use of voir dire to prosecute crimes. 93
Therefore, like the Tagala court's interpretation of Alaska Statute
§ 12.62.030(a),194 the Commonwealth's interpretation of Virginia Code
§ 19.2-389(A)(1) is a fair one. 95 The Commonwealth's Attorney should be
able to use criminal history data of jurors during voir dire because this use
furthers the administration of criminal justice by a criminal justice agency.
However, Chief Judge Chamblin did not reach this conclusion because he did
not employ the type of analysis used by the Commonwealth's Attorney, the
Supreme Court of Iowa, the Alaska Court of Appeals, and the Missouri Court
of Appeals. 196 Eschewing an analysis of the controlling statutes, Chief Judge
Chamblin found other reasons for prohibiting the Commonwealth's Attorney
from using jurors' criminal records in voir dire."9
188. Id.
189. Compare supra note 162 and accompanying text (examining Alaska's definition of
"law enforcement"), with infra note 190 and accompanying text (examining Virginia's defini-
tion of "administration of criminal justice").
190. VA. CoDE ANN. § 9-169(1) (Miechie 1950) (emphasis added).
191. See id. § 15.2-1627(B) (Michie 1950) (stating duties of Commonwealth's Attorney
or assistant Commonwealth's Attorney include "duty of prosecuting all warrants, indictments
or informations charging a felony").
192. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's statutory
definition of "criminal justice agency," which includes agencies whose principal function is
prosecution of crimes).
193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "administration
of criminal justice" provided by § 9-169); VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A.-14 (requiring court and allowing
parties to question jurors as to various qualifications and biases after jurors are sworn in voir dire).
194. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing court's interpretation of
§ 12.62.030(a) in Tagala).
195. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Commonwealth's claim that
§ 19.2-389 authorized use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire by prosecutors).
196. Comparesupra notes 104-11,133-34,149-50 andaccompanyingtext(discussingstatu-
tory analysis used by courts in Bessenecker, Tagala, and MeMahan, respectively), with Order,
supra note 17 (prohibiting use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire without discussing
whether statutes regulating criminal history records allow use ofthese records in voir dire).
197. See Order, supra note 17, at 3-5 (discussing privacy of jurors and unfairness to
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V Chief Judge Chamblin 's Reasons for Prohibiting the
Use of Jurors' Criminal Records in Voir Dire
Rather than decide that the Commonwealth lacked the authority to use
jurors' criminal records in voir dire, Chief Judge Chamblin focused on reasons
ofjuror privacy and fairness to the defendant to support his order.'98 This Part
examines these justifications in greater detail, beginning with an examination
of the issue of privacy in the context ofjury service. This Part concludes by
evaluating whether allowing prosecutors to use criminal records in voir dire
is unfair to the defendant, and if so, how that unfairness should be remedied.
A. Protecting the Privacy Rights of Jurors
1. Development of the Right to Informational Privacy'
The Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution does not protect a
general right to privacy.2 However, the Court has recognized more discreet
privacy interests that the Constitution does protect.20' In Whalen v. Roe,20 2 the
Supreme Court divided the privacy interests which the Constitution protects
into two categories: (1) an interest in avoiding disclosure of private informa-
tion and (2) an interest in the ability to make certain important personal
decisions independently.2 3 Four months after its decision in Whalen, the
defendant as reasons for prohibiting use of jurors' criminal history data); infra Part V
(discussing Chief Judge Chamblin's reasons for his prohibitive order).
198. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (identifying juror privacy and fairness to
defendant as two main reasons supporting Chief Judge Chamblin's order).
199. This Note's analysis proceeds on the assumption that the right to privacy that Chief
Judge Chamblin's order references is based on a right to privacy which the United States Con-
stitution guarantees. The analysis will proceed in this fashion because the Virginia laws recog-
nizing a right to privacy do not apply to the context of ajuror's criminal history records. See VA.
CODEANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1950) (protecting person from unauthorized use of name or iden-
tity); id. § 32.1-127.1:03(A) (protecting patient's right to privacy in personal medical records).
200. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (stating that "the protection
of a person's general right to privacy - his right to be let alone by other people - is, like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States");
ef Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,607-09 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasizing support
of majority opinion as long as it does not contradict principle stated in Katz that no general
constitutional right to privacy exists).
201. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (listing following privacy interests
that Constitution protects: contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972);
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); family relationships, Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42
(1942); and child rearing and education, Piercev. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925)).
202. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
203. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,598-600 (1977) (upholding New York practice of
keeping records of names and addresses of all persons obtaining Schedule II drugs from physi-
cians by prescription). In Whalen, the Supreme Court considered whether the New York State
1106 56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1079 (1999)
Court in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services2° further developed
Whalen's right to informational privacy' ° by craftng a two-part test to
determine violations of that right.2"a First, a person must show a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information or material at issue.2" If the person
successfully makes this showing, the right to privacy recognized in Whalen
attaches." 8 The Court then balances the scope and nature of the intrusion
against the public's interest in disclosure to determine whether the public's
interest warrants disclosure despite the intrusion on that person's privacy
interest.2" Although some courts view the development of this right to
Department of Health could maintain a centralized computer record of the names and addresses
of all persons obtaining Schedule II drugs by prescription. Id. at 591. The law required physi-
cians prescribing Schedule II drugs to fill out the prescription on an official form in triplicate
with copies going to the physician, to the pharmacist, and to the New York State Department
of Health. Id. at 593. The statutory scheme provided numerous safeguards to prevent the
unauthorized public disclosure of the information collected. Id. at 593-95. Both patients
receiving the medication at issue and doctors prescribing the medication challenged the scheme
as violating their right to privacy. Id. at 595. The Court held that neither the mere possibility
of public disclosure, nor the required disclosure to state employees was sufficient to constitute
an invasion of a right to privacy protected by the 14th Amendment Id. at 603-04.
204. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
205. See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 5 (referring to privacy interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters recognized in Whalen as "right to informational privacy").
206. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 US. 425, 457-58 (1977) (outlining
test to determine whether disputed action violates privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters). In Nixon, former President Nixon (Nixon) challenged the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (Act), by which Congress intended to nullify an
agreement that Nixon and the Administrator of General Services (Administrator) made which
gave Nixon legal title of the documents and tape recordings that Nixon amassed during his
presidency. Id. at 429-32. The Act instructed the Administrator to take possession of Nixon's
presidential materials and to promulgate regulations governing public access to those materials.
Id. at 434-35. The Act also required regulations detailing a plan for processing the materials
in order to sort out and return to Nixon those materials that were "personal and private in
nature" and had no historical value. Id. at 435-36. The Court had to decide whether the Act
violated Nixon's right to privacy. Id. at 455. The Court answered this question in the negative
by looking to the privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters recognized in
Whalen and employing a two-part test Id. at 457-58. The Court concluded that although Nixon
had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to a small fraction of the materials, the
interests in public access to the information and the limited and necessary nature of the intrusion
outweighed Nixon's privacy interest. Id. at 465.
207. See id. at 458 (adopting language from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53
(1967)).
208. See Glover, supra note 18, at 711 (describing Nixon's "legitimate expectation of
privacy" standard as means for determining if Whalen's privacy interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters attaches).
209. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458 (describing balancing test court should employ once
litigation shows legitimate expectation of privacy); see also Weinstein, supra note 18, at 4
(discussing Nixon balancing test); Glover, supra note 18, at 711 (same).
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privacy in Whalen and Nixon as merely a product of dictum and refuse to
recognize it as controlling, the Supreme Court and a majority of United States
Courts of Appeals have recognized Whalen's rightto informational privacy. 1
2. The Right to Informational Privacy in the Context ofJury Service
a. Adapting the Nixon Balancing Test to the Unique Demands
of Jury Sertice
The Supreme Court has had little opportunity to give lower courts any
guidance as to how to apply the Whalen right to informational privacy and the
Nixon test in the context of jury service. The Court has discussed this matter
only once,21 noting in dictum in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
212
that voir dire, in certain circumstances, may implicate a potential juror's
privacy interest to a degree sufficient to warrant the closing of voir dire to the
public.213 However, Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence in Press-
Enterprise to emphasize that the Court's decision did not rest on, nor was it
even required to examine, any right to privacy for prospective jurors.
214
Expressing concern that accepting the application of the right to informational
privacy in the context of jury service could bring about unintended and
complicated results, 211 Justice Blackmun raised, as an example, the question
210. See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that despite United States Court ofAppeals
for Sixth Circuit's refusal to follow rule of Whalen and Nixon regarding right to informational
privacy, Supreme Court and majority of United States Courts of Appeals recognize the right as
"well-entrenched").
211. See id. at 7 (stating that United States Supreme Court has applied right of privacy to
context ofjury service just once, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct, 464 U.S. 501 (1984)).
212. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
213. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) (stating jury
selection process may give rise to compelling privacy interest for prospective juror when voir
dire questioning touches on deeply personal matters). In Press-Enterprise, the Court confronted
the question of whether the guarantee of open public criminal trials included voir dire proceed-
ings. Id. at 503. The trial judge had denied a motion from Press-Enterprise to open voir dire
proceedings to the public and press, closing all but three days of a six-week voir dire. Id. Once
voir dire was complete, Press-Enterprise moved for the release of the voir dire transcripts, which
the court also denied in order to protect the defendant's right to an impartial jury and the jurors'
right to privacy. Id. at 504. The Supreme Court found that courts historically have treated
criminal trials, including voir dire, as presumptively open. Id. at 505-09. In order to overcome
that presumption, a court must show an overriding interest in closure in order to preserve
"higher values" and that the closure is narrowly tailored to that interest Id. at 510. The Court
decided that the trial court's findings were not sufficient to warrant closure, and even if they
were, the trial court's failures to consider alternatives to such a broad closure made the closure
unconstitutional. Id. at 510-11.
214. See id. at 513-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Court did not decide
whether prospective jurors have right to privacy).
215. See id. at 515 (Blackmun, I., concurring) (stating that recognizing jurors' right to
privacy could unnecessarily complicate voir dire proceeding).
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of whether a juror could claim a right to privacy in refusing to answer a
question posed during voir dire.1
16
Eleven years later, Justice Blackmun's hypothetical problem became a
judicial reality. In Brandborg v. Lucas,"' a federal magistrate judge encoun-
tered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arising out of a conviction for
contempt of court.218 A state court judge had held Diane Brandborg in con-
tempt for repeatedly refusing to answer 11 of the 110 questions on a jury
questionnaire.219 In explaining her refusal, Brandborg claimed that the ques-
tions were of a "very private nature" and irrelevant to her ability to serve as
an impartial juror."
In deciding to set aside her conviction, the court recognized that Brand-
borg claimed the right to informational privacy recognized in Whalen." The
court then applied the Nixon test, adapting it to the unique requirements of a
juror's claim to privacy in the context of a criminal trial.rn The court began
by noting that although a person can forfeit her expectation of privacy by
216. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that Court should not assume existence of
jurors' privacy interest without considering its implications).
217. 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
218. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 353 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (noting contempt
of court conviction and resulting sentence as basis for petition for writ of habeas corpus). In
Brandborg, the court had to answer the question Justice Blackmun foresaw in his concurrence
in Press-Enterprise: Can ajuror refuse to answer voir dire questions based on her asserted right
to privacy? Id. at 355. After being summoned for jury duty in a capital murder case, Diane
Brandborg refused to answer 11 of the 110 questions in the jury questionnaire. Id. at 353.
Brandborg explained that she would not answer the questions because they were of a "very
private nature" and were irrelevant as to whether she could be a fair and impartial juror. Id.
After Brandborg's continued refusal to answer the questions, the trial court judge held her in
contempt of court and sentenced her to 3 days in jail and a $200 fine. Id. at 355. Brandborg
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court after the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals denied her appeal. Id. After finding that merely serving as a juror did not
forfeit a person's right to informational privacy as articulated in Whalen, id. at 357-59, the
federal magistrate judge found that the trial judge's failure to determine the relevance of the
disputed questions, coupled with the court's failure to balance the various interests involved,
was sufficient justification to entitle Brandborg to refuse to answer the questions. Id. at 361.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge set aside Brandborg's conviction on the grounds that it
violated her right to privacy. Id.
219. Id. at 353-55. The questions Brandborg refused to answer sought information
regarding her previous year's combined family income, religious preference, political party
affiliation, political leaning, television watching habits, magazines and newspapers subscribed
to or regularly read, type of vehicle, club and association membership, volunteer work, routine
reading material, whether under a physician's care or taking medication, and NRA or gun club
membership. Id. at 354.
220. Id. at 353.
221. See id. at 359 (noting that Brandborg was claiming interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters and citing Whalen).
222. See id. at 355-61 (finding jury duty did not remove expectation of privacy and con-
ducting balancing test of competing interests).
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taking action that opens matters to public scrutiny,' fulfilling one's duty as
ajuror is not a voluntary waiver of one's expectation of privacy. 24 Citing the
trial court's duty to control the voir dire process in order to protect the various
interests involved,' the court proposed a two-step approach for deciding
whether ajuror can refuse to answer a voir dire question because of a privacy
interest in the information sought. 6 First, prior to voir dire, the court should
examine the relevancy of the voir dire questions because prospective jurors
should have to answer only relevant questions. 7 Courts should make pro-
spective jurors aware of their right to informational privacy, either in the jury
questionnaire or at voir dire.' Second, if the juror raises a claim of privacy
in response to a relevant question, the court must consider four competing
interests: (1) the juror's right to informational privacy, (2) the defendant's
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, (3) the prosecution's right to an
impartial jury, and (4) the public's right of access to jury information. 9 If the
court concludes that the balance of interests requires the juror to disclose the
information, the court should conduct an in camera hearing to determine the
least intrusive means for obtaining the information."
b. Applying the Nixon Balancing Test to Jurors'
Criminal History Records
(1) Jurors Do Not Have a Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy in Criminal History Records
An analysis of whether a juror's right to informational privacy attaches
to the juror's criminal history records begins by determining whether the juror
223. Id. at 357 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,459 (1977)).
224. Id. Although jury service is a part of a presumptively open process, see Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,505-10 (1984) (describing public nature ofjury
trials and jury selection throughout history), jury duty does not act as a per se waiver of one's
expectation of privacy because one does not willingly serve as a juror. "'[P]rospective jurors
do not seek out the public forum; they are summoned; often unwillingly, to fulfill a public duty
in the justice system' . .. [and] the potential juror must attend the proceedings or face the
possibility of criminal or civil sanctions." Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 357 (ED.
Tex. 1995) (quoting Glover, supra note 18, at 712) (alteration in original).
225. Id. at359-60 (citingPress-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at512).
226. Id. at 360.
227. See id. (outlining first of two-step process and citing United States v. Robinson, 475
F.2d 376,381 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
228. Id.
229. See id. at 361 (referring to opinion's earlier discussion ofjuror, defendant, prosecu-
tion, and public's interests).
230. See id. (recommending use of in camera hearing to allow parties to obtain needed
information from juror without unnecessary disclosure of juror's private matters). In camera
is defined as "in chambers; in private." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990).
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has a legitimate expectation of privacy in that information. 1 Although Chief
Judge Chamblin alluded to this expectation of privacy, 23 he failed to examine
the issue adequately. The Commonwealth, however, argued that the informa-
tion contained in a person's criminal record is not private at all.3
In Virginia, a person's criminal history record contains idenffying infor-
mation along with notations and descriptions of arrests, the filing of formal
charges, the dispositions of those charges, and any detentions. 4 This informa-
tion is already available through various public documents. 5 The Supreme
Court has stated that when information is available from public records, any
privacy interest that a person may claim in that information "fades.12
6
Additionally, a person's criminal history is theoretically available
through jury questionnaires or voir dire questioning.2 7 A juror must divulge
the information that a criminal history record contains upon inquiry by the
prosecutor because voir dire questions seeking this information are relevant
to determining the juror's qualification and biases 38 If the juror must dis-
close the information in this manner, the juror cannot reasonably claim a
violation of privacy when the prosecutor acquires that information by access-
ing the juror's criminal history records.
Not only is the information that a person's criminal records contains
public in nature, but that information can be far less personal than some
information that jury questionnaires or voir dire forces jurors to divulge. Voir
dire questions often inquire about matters that are quite personal in nature. 9
231. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text (discussing legitimate expectation of
privacy inquiry as that which determines whether Whalen's right to informational privacy
attaches under Nixon test).
232. See Order, supra note 17, at 4 (stating prosecutor's use ofjuror's criminal and driving
histories violates juror's "reasonable expectation that this information would not be shared with
the person over whom the juror sits in judgment").
233. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 5 (arguing that
information which prosecutors gain through criminal history checks is already matter of public
record); Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 27-31 (same).
234. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-169(4) (Michie 1950) (defining criminal history record
information).
235. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 5 (arguing that
information available from criminal history check through VCIN is already matter of public
record); Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 28 (same).
236. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,494-95 (1975).
237. See State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (noting that
criminal history data is available to parties through jury questionnaire and voir dire questioning).
238. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352,358 (ED. Tex. 1995) (summarizing case
law on limiting voir dire questions as allowing specific question if it is "relevant to determining
the bias or prejudice of a prospective juror"); supra Parts MilA-B (discussing utility of criminal
history data in discovering biased and disqualified jurors).
239. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 6 (isting juror's family
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Perhaps nothing illustrates this point more clearly than the jury questionnaire
used in the most-watched trial of the 20th century - the murder trial of O.J.
Simpson. The jury questionnaire inthe Simpson trial posed 302 questions to
the prospective jurors covering a wide variety of topics.24 The jurors had to
provide detailed information regarding organizational memberships and
affiliations;241 reading habits, television viewing habits, and other leisure
interests; 242 charitable donations and volunteer work;243 religious beliefs and
practices;2 4 political views and affihations;2 45 spouses's place of birth, eth-
nicity, employment, and education; experiences with domestic violence;2 47
and employment history for the past ten years.24 Two of the more intrusive
questions regarding racial issues asked jurors about the racial and ethnic
make-up of the neighborhood where they grew up249 and whether they ever
had dated a person of another race." Jurors had to reveal whether they ever
had consulted an expert other than a medical doctor" 1 or ever had given blood
or urine samples for testing. 2 Jurors also had to disclose if they currently
were taking medication, as well as what the medication was, the reasons for
taking it, and how often they took it.' Jurors even had to answer whether
they owned a knife designed for a purpose other than cooking.1
4
history of drug and alcohol abuse and juror's personal beliefs among possible subjects of
inquiry during voir dire).
240. See Juror Questionnaire, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1994 WL 564388, at
*1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct 3, 1994) (dividing questionnaire into 28 topics). Please note that the
last question on the questionnaire is numbered 294, but an error occurs in the numbering after
question 254. Id. at *22. The questionnaire actually contains 302 numbered questions, many
with multiple subparts. In this Note, references to individual question numbers will reflect what
the question should be numbered in order to avoid confusion that may arise from two different
questions sharing the same number.
241. Id. at *15 questions 160-61; *17 questions 189-90; *20 questions 221, 223; *22
question 264; *23 question 267.
242. Id. at *20-*22 questions 244-62; *23 questions 268-69,277-80.
243. Id. at *16 question 174; *23 questions 265-66.
244. Id. at *18 question201.
245. Id. at *18-*19 questions 202-205.
246. Id. at *5 questions 49-55.
247. Id. at *15-*16 questions 162-67.
248. Id. at *3 question 25.
249. Id. at *17 question 191.
250. Id. question 186.
251. Id. at *19 question 206.
252. Id. questions 210-211.
253. Id. at *2 question 8.
254. Id. at *24 question 289.
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These questions were far more intrusive than the eleven questions that
Dianna Brandborg objected to inBrandborg,"5 and yet the Simpson jurors had
to answer them truthfully under penalty ofperjury.16 The intrusive nature of
these questions becomes even more apparent when considered in the context
of the Simpson trial, which became a fixture in the national media from the
day of the murders until after the jury reached its verdict. If jurors can be
required to reveal the type of information sought in the Simpson questionnaire,
they hardly can argue that criminal history data is too private to be disclosed.
Additionally, at least one court has decided that no legitimate expectation
of privacy exists in criminal history records.7 In Eagle v. Morgan,"6 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the unwanted
disclosure of a person's criminal record did not violate any constitutionally
protected right to informational privacy. 9 The court observed that the devel-
opment of Whalen's right to informational privacy has led courts to limit its
application to "extremely personal" information.2 6' At the same time, courts
have refused to recognize a privacy interest in matters such as criminal activ-
ity, arrests, and false rumors that a person has committed a crime.2 ' Criminal
255. Compare supra text accompanying notes 241-54 (listing particularly intrusive ques-
tions in jury questionnaire used in Simpson murder trial), with Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F.
Supp. 352,354 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (listing questions Ms. Brandborg objected to answering).
256. See Juror Questionnaire, supra note 240, at *25 (requiring juror to sign name attesting
to truth of answers under penalty of peijury).
257. See infra note 262 and accompanying text (discussing view of United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that no legitimate expectation of privacy exists in criminal
history records).
258. 88 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1996).
259. See Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620,625 (8th Cir. 1996) (deciding person's prior guilty
plea is, by its very nature, within public domain, thereby negating any claim to legitimate
expectation of privacy). In Eagle, a group of police officers accessed federal and state criminal
records databases in order to discover whether Eagle had a prior felony conviction. Id. at 622.
Upon finding a guilty plea to theft of property, one of the officers revealed the conviction at a
city council meeting in order to discredit the results of Eagle's survey comparing local police
salary with other jurisdictions. Id. at 623. Eagle claimed that the search of the criminal records
databases was illegal and the unwanted disclosure of his criminal record violated his constitu-
tional right to privacy. Id. The Court decided that the events recorded on one's criminal record
are by their very nature within the public domain. Id. at 625. Therefore, the Court refused to
recognize any legitimate expectation of privacy in one's criminal record. Id.
260. See id. (listing types of information to which courts have applied right of privacy as
follows: information about spouse gained through marriage, Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45
F.3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1995); financial information, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 5 v.
City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1987); medical records, United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); and person's naked body, York
v. Story, 324 F.2d 450,455 (9th Cir. 1963)).
261. See id. (listing types of information to which courts have refused to apply right of
privacy as follows: criminal activity, Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995);
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history data resembles those types of information that courts have not pro-
tected more closely than the extremely personal information that the courts
have protected. Accordingly, the court decided that no legitimate expectation
of privacy exists in the information contained in criminal history records72
The court's conclusion in Eagle appears to contradict the Supreme
Court's statement in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press263 that a substantial privacy interest exists in
criminal history records.2" However, Reporters Committee is distinguishable
from Eagle. The Supreme Court's discussion of criminal history records in
Reporters Committee occurred in the context of a statutory right to privacy
protected by Congress in the Freedom of Information Act.26 In contrast, the
right to privacy that the court considered in Eagle is constitutional in nature."
As the Supreme Court has stated, analysis of a statutorily protected right to
privacy is distinct from an analysis of a constitutionally protected right to
arrests, Holman v. Central Arkansas Broad. Co., 610 F.2d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1979); false
rumors of criminal activity, Baker v. Howard, 419 F.2d 376,377 (9th Cir. 1969)).
262. Id. at 628.
263. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
264. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (stating that "privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial"). In Reporters
Committee, the Court had to decide whether the disclosure of a person's criminal history records
was an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" within the meaning of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Id. at 751. Several reporters made FOIA requests to the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for the production of the criminal history records of four people. Id. at 757.
The Court determined that a substantial privacy interest exists in the criminal history records
that the federal government compiles and collects based on the following factors: (1) the
common-law and dictionary understandings of privacy, (2) the basic difference between a
federally compiled collection of criminal history data and the same information scattered among
various public documents stored in different locales, (3) federal statutory provisions severely
limiting access to criminal history records, (4) similar state policies, (5) prior cases recognizing
privacy interest in nondisclosure of information that was public at one time, and (6) prior cases
recognizing privacy interest in keeping private information away from public view. Id. at,767,
769. The Court then examined the central purpose of the FOIA, characterizing it as protecting
the people's right to know "what their government is up to" by exposing government action and
policies to public scrutiny. Id. at 772-74. Distinguishing a private citizen's rap sheet from a
record of governmental actions, the Court held that a third party's FOIA request for the criminal
records of a private citizen can reasonably be expected, as a categorical matter, to invade that
citizen's privacy. Id. at 780. The Court also held that the invasion of privacy is unwarranted
when the FOIA request is merely for records the government happens to be storing, as opposed
to documents about official action. Id.
265. See id. at 751 (stating question before Court as whether disclosure of rap sheets to
third party could reasonably be considered unwarranted invasion of privacy within meaning of
FOIA).
266. See Eagle v Moran, 88 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting Eagle's claim that
unjustified search and unwanted public disclosure of his criminal record violated his constitu-
tional right to privacy).
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privacy." Thus, the conclusion of the court in Eagle that no legitimate
expectation of privacy exists in criminal history records268 is valid notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's statement in Reporters Committee.
The Supreme Court's view in Reporters Committee is also distinguish-
able from the facts surrounding Chief Judge Chamblin's order. First, Chief
Judge Chamblin's order concerned itself with a juror's constitutional right
to privacy, unlike Reporters Committee.269 Second, the issue confronting
the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee was the availability of a person's
criminal history records to the public at large.27 The use ofjurors' criminal
history records by prosecutors in voir dire, on the other hand, does not impli-
cate this concern. Chief Judge Chamblin did not issue his order to prevent
the dissemination ofjurors' criminal history records to the public at large.27'
Rather, Chief Judge Chamblin sought to prevent prosecutors from using the
records for the discreet purpose of conducting voir dire.272 Therefore, an
application of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reporters Committee to the
narrow use of criminal history records by prosecutors is inappropriate.2"
Any one of the reasons discussed above should be sufficient to find no
legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal history records. Together, these
267. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 762 n.13 (noting that question of statutory
meaning of privacy under FOIA is "not the same" as determining whether Constitution protects
specific privacy interest).
268. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (discussing conclusion of court in Eagle
that no legitimate expectation of privacy exists in criminal history records).
269. See supra note 199 (discussing why this Note assumes right to privacy that Chief
Judge Chamblin relied on is constitutional in nature); supra note 267 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's recognition of distinction between statutorily protected right to
privacy and constitutionally protected right to privacy).
270. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Piess, 489
U.S. 749, 754-55 (1989) (noting § 552(a)(3) of FOIA makes documents requested under FOIA
available to "any person").
271. See Order, supra note 17, at 3, 4 (discussing concern that prosecutor's use ofjuror's
criminal history records in voir dire violates juror's expectation of privacy that parties over
whom juror sits in judgment will not have access to juror's criminal history information).
272. See id. (discussing problems surrounding prosecutors' use ofjurors' criminal history
records in voir dire).
273. The fact that prosecutors are members of law enforcement agencies is also notewor-
thy. See supra notes 155-57, 161-63, 167-69, 187-91 and accompanying text (discussing
whether Iowa, Alaska, Missouri, and Virginia laws, respectively, consider prosecutors to be
members of law enforcement agencies). The Supreme Court in Reporters Committee cited
federal and state policies regulating access to criminal history records as basis for recognizing
privacy interest in these records. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 764-67. Both the federal
and the state policies allow law enforcement agencies to access criminal history records. See
id. at 765 (noting FBI's policy allowing dissemination of rap sheets to law enforcement agen-
cies); see, e.g., supra notes 155-57, 161-63, 167-69, 187-91 and accompanying text (discusiing
provisions of Iowa, Alaska, Missouri, and Virginia law allowing law enforcement agencies
access to criminal history records).
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reasons confirm the soundness ofthe Eagle decision that a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy does not extend to criminal records. The information is public
in fact and in nature,274 it must be divulged by the juror during voir dire, 27S and
it is far less personal than other information that jurors may have to reveal
during voir dire.2 6 By comparison, the information that criminal history
records contain is far less private than that contained in income tax returns,
information courts have upheld as a valid tool for federal prosecutors to use
in exercising peremptory challenges ofjurorsY7 Thus, a juror cannot claim
a legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal history records. Chief Judge
Chamblin was remiss in recognizing this claim as a basis for his order.
(2) The State's Interests and the Public's Interests Outweigh
Any Possible Privacy Interest in Jurors' Criminal History Records
Once a court has found a legitimate expectation of privacy, Nixon re-
quires a balancing test weighing the scope and nature of the intrusion against
the public's interest in disclosureY8 Thus, even if Chief Judge Chamblin
correctly assumed the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in a
juror's criminal history records, that privacy interest would not be sufficient
to warrant a prohibition on the prosecutorial use of those records in voir dire.
As was the case in Brandborg, the uniqueness of jury service in a criminal
trial requires a modification of the Nixon balancing test, taking into account
any additional interests that prohibiting prosecutors from using jurors' crimi-
nal history data in voir dire may implicate.
As discussed above, the State has an interest in accessing a juror's
criminal history records for use in voir dire in order to protect its right to a
qualified and impartial juryY9 Prohibiting the State from using the valu-
able tool of criminal history records during voir dire clearly inhibits this
274. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text (discussing public nature of criminal
history information).
275. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing how jurors must divulge
criminal history information during voir dire process).
276. See supra notes 240-56 and accompanying text (discussing jury questionnaire from
Simpson case).
277. See United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1958) (upholding prosecu-
tor's use of information taken from jurors' federal income tax returns as aid in exercising
peremptory challenges). The information taken from the jurors' tax returns included the
taxpayer's occupation, amount of and source of income, number ofdependants, amount of taxes
paid or refund received, and any unusual deductions. Id. at 882.
278. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977) (describing
balancing test courts should employ once party shows legitimate expectation of privacy); supra
notes 204-11 and accompanying text (same).
279. See supra Parts BIlA-B (discussing State's interest in discovering disqualified jurors
and jurors potentially biased against State).
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fight." ° Depending on the situation, use of jurors' criminal history records
may implicate the defendant's right to an impartial jury as well.2 1 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the public has an interest in ensuring that
both the defendant and the State have the opportunity to present their respec-
tive cases before a qualified and impartial jury.2" In Press-Enterprise, the
Court stated that the value of having an open voir dire proceeding is in pro-
moting both a fair trial and the appearance of fairness.s Maintaining that
appearance of fairness is essential to securing the public's confidence in the
judicial system. 4 The Court's concern withthe appearance of fairness applies
with equal force to the use ofjurors' criminal history records by prosecutors.
Prohibiting prosecutors from using jurors' criminal history records severely
inhibits their ability to discover disqualified and potentially biased jurors."5
A rule that hinders either party from securing an impartial jury gives the
criminal trial an appearance of unfairness and thus adversely affects the
public's confidence in the criminal justice system." 6
Any privacy interest a juror could claim in his criminal history records
is simply not sufficient to outweigh the interests of the State, the defendant,
and the public. The scope of the intrusion into a juror's private matters is
minimal. The information that criminal history records contain is all public
information available from various documents which the court clerk keeps on
file.' Thus, the juror has only a minimal interest in keeping this information
private.2"' The nature of the intrusion is also minimal. Prosecutors use
criminal history data solely for the purpose of conducting voir dire to secure
a qualified and impartial jury."s9 Prosecutors do not disseminate a juror's
280. See supra Parts IHA-B (discussing value of criminal history records in discovering
disqualified jurors and jurors potentially biased against State).
281. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing situations when use ofjurors' criminal records sup-
ports defendant's right to impartial jury).
282. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (noting public's
interest in ensuring that both parties receive trial by fair and impartial jury)..
283. See id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,569-71 (1980)).
284. Id.
285. See supra Parts IIIA-B (discussing utility ofjurors' criminal history records in helping
prosecutors secure impartial and qualified jury).
286. Cf Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 14 (arguing that Chief
Judge Chamblin's order "risks jeopardizing public confidence in jury verdicts because the
public will question whether a jury acquitted a defendant because it was biased against the
Commonwealth and not because it engaged in an impartial consideration of the law and the
evidence").
287. See supra Part V.A.2.b.1 (discussing public nature of information that criminal history
records contain).
288. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1976) (stating that "interests
in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record").
289. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 2 (arguing that Coin-
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criminal history to the public at large, as the police officer did in Eagle.' In
light of the minimal scope and nature of any claimed intrusion, the interests
of the State and some defendants in a qualified and impartial jury and the
public's interest in maintaining an appearance of fairness outweigh the
questionable claim of privacy in criminal history records. Therefore, Chief
Judge Chamblin improperly relied on protecting juror privacy as a reason for
prohibiting the use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire.
B. Protecting the Defendant from Unfairness
In addition to protecting juror privacy, Chief Judge Chamblin based his
order on a desire to protect the defendant from unfairness. 1 According to
Chief Judge Chamblin, the Commonwealth's attorney gains an unfair advan-
tage over the defendant in voir dire by having access to the information con-
tained in jurors' criminal history records.' Because of his concerns for pro-
tecting juror privacy, Chief Judge Chamblin would not remedy this unfairness
by making the jurors' criminal history records available to the defendant.' 3
Having rejected juror privacy as a legitimate reason for prohibiting the Com-
monwealth's attorney from using these criminal history records in voir dire,294
the relevant question becomes whether such use of jurors' criminal history
records is unfair to the defendant, and if so, whether a less-restrictive remedy
exists that would protect the government's right to an impartial jury."5
1. Allowing the Prosecutor to Use Jurors' Criminal History Records
in Voir Dire May Be Unfair to the Defendant
According to Chief Judge Chamblin, a criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial includes the right to have access to information in possession of the
monwealth's Attorney has statutory authority to use criminal history data in voir dire to discover
possible biases of jurors and to prevent disqualified people from serving as jurors); Petition for
Appeal, supra note 37, at 19 (arguing that use of criminal history data facilitates detection of
biased or disqualified jurors).
290. See Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1996) (reporting that defendants
publicly read contents of plaintiff's criminal history at city council meeting); supra note 259
(discussing Eagle).
291. See Order, supra note 17, at 4-5 (discussing unfairness that defendant suffers due to
unequal access to juror information).
292. Id. at 5.
293. See id. at 4 (stating that giving defendant access to jurors' criminal history informa-
tion cannot solve problem of unequal access because doing so violates jurors' reasonable
expectation of privacy).
294. See supra Part V.A (discussing development of right to informational privacy and its
misapplication in context of Chief Judge Chamblin's order).
295. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing government's right to
impartial jury).
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prosecutor that the defendant cannot otherwise obtain by law.296 Due process
does not require absolute equality.' Yet, a handful ofjurisdictions have ruled
that fairness requires prosecutors to provide the defendant with the criminal
history records ofjurors gathered for voir dire.' Some courts have based their
decisions, in part, on the need to place the defendant on "equal footing" with
the government. 29 However, a handful of courts have rejected claims that the
principles of fairness and equality require disclosure ofjurors' criminal records
to defendants. In fact, the majority ofjurisdictions that have considered the
296. Order, supra note 17, at 5.
297. See Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 281 (9th Cir. 1958) (describing logical
extension of defendant's claim that lack of "perfect equality" denied him fair trial as "ridiculous"
and not worthy of serious consideration); also Petition for Appeal, supra note 37, at 32-33
(arguing due process does not require "an even playing field").
298. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 612-13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (citing "sense of
fundamental fairness" as reason for broadly interpreting discovery rules to require prosecutors
to disclose to defendant criminal records of jurors that prosecutor intends to use in voir dire);
People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446,465 (Cal. 1981) (en bane) (granting trial court discretionary
authority to require disclosure to defendant of prosecutor's information about jurors because
inequality reflects on fairness of trial); Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Colo. 1972)
(en bane) (finding "fundamental fairness and justice" require equal treatment of both defendant
and prosecution with regard to access to jurors' criminal histories); State v. Bessenecker, 404
N.W.2d 134, 138-39 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (agreeing with other jurisdictions that fairness
requires jurors' criminal records made available to prosecutor also must be made available to
defendant, unless good cause can be shown otherwise); Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E,2d
897, 901 (Mass. 1966) (finding public's interest in assuring fair trial for defendant sufficient
grounds for requiring disclosure to defendant of information about prospective jurors gathered
by police officers and given to district attorney, even though defendant did not claim that trial
court's denial of disclosure deprived him offair trial); People v. Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d 796, 801
(Mich. Ct App. 1973) (concluding that "fundamental fairness" requires prosecutor to disclose
to defendant investigatory reports of prospective jurors); cf. United States v. Hamer, 259 F.2d
274, 281 (9th Cir. 1958) (rejecting per se rule requiring disclosure to defendant of prosecution's
'jury book" containing information as to jurors' voting records in previous jury service, but
giving trial judge responsibility of ensuring that neither prosecution nor defendant has "unfair
advantage" as result of use ofjury information).
299. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604,612 (Alaska Ct App. 1991) (stating that fundamen-
tal fairness required placing defendant "upon an equal footing" with prosecution by requiring
disclosure of jurors' criminal records in prosecutor's possession); People v. Murtishaw, 631
P.2d 446, 465 (Cal. 1981) (en bane) (stating that "inequality reflects on the fairness of the
criminal process"); Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Colo. 1972) (en bane) (stating
that district attorney and public defender have same ethical and legal responsibilities to public,
and thus must be "treated as equals" with respect to access to jurors' criminal histories); People
v. Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that fundamental fairness
requires placing defendant "on equal footing" with prosecution by requiring disclosure of
prosecutor's investigatory report ofjurors).
300. See McBride v. State, 477 A.2d 174,188 (Del. 1984) (rejecting defendant's claimthat
trial court's refusal to compel disclosure of jurors' criminal records gave prosecution unfair
advantage in voir dire, thus violating defendant's due process and equal protection rights
under 14th Amendment); State v. Kandies, 467 S.E.2d 67, 77 (N.C. 1996) (rejecting defen-
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matter have rejected the idea of requiring disclosure ofjurors' criminal records
to defendants without examining notions of fairness or equality.3°" Even so, the
concern for fairness to the defendant merits a closer analysis.
The Supreme Court has stated that due process requires fundamental fair-
ness.302  The Court also has recognized the uncertainty in discovering the
requirements of fundamental fairness in a given situation.3 3 However, the
Court has provided the following simple framework to guide the inquiry:
(1) consider relevant precedents, then (2) assess the interests that are at
stake.1 ' Although it is true that some jurisdictions have determined that
dant's claim that trial court's refusal to require disclosure of jurors' criminal records to defen-
dant violated defendant's right to due process and right to fair and impartial jury); cf. State v.
Hernandez, 393 N.W.2d 28, 29-30 (M n. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting defendant's claim that
fundament fairness requires disclosure of jurors' criminal records to defendant, but noting that
prosecutor has ethical obligation to disclose knowledge that juror has not been truthful about
criminal record).
301. See Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950) (rejecting defendant's
claim that he should have had access to prosecutor's report of F.B.I. investigation of jurors);
Christoffel v. United States, 171 F.2d 1004, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (ruling government is not
required to furnish to defendant notes made from F.B.I. investigation of jurors for use in
selectingjury), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 84,90 (1949); Kelley v. State, 602 So. 2d 473,
477-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (ruling defendant not entitled to disclosure of jurors' criminal
records because information does not fall within scope of Brady material and background
information is available to defendant through voir dire questioning); State v. Monathan, 294 So.
2d 401, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding trial court's decision to deny defendant's
motion for discovery ofjurors' criminal records); Thompson v. State, 411 S.E.2d 886, 888-89
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling prosecutor is under no obligation to disclose criminal histories of
jurors to defendant because information is not exculpatory and there is no right to discovery in
criminal cases); State v. Jackson, 450 So. 2d 621, 628 (La. 1984) (ruling defendant was not
entitled to disclosure of jurors' criminal records because information was not pertinent to
purpose of defendant's voir dire, which is to remove jurors who "will not approach the verdict
in a detached and objective manner"); People v. McIntosh, 252 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Mch. 1977)
(stating defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to inspect prosecutor's "jury dossier"
compiled from public records); State v. White, 909 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Mo. Ct App. 1995)
(deciding that, in absence of statutory mandate for disclosure, prosecutor is not obligated to
disclose jurors' arrest records to defendant); Commonwealth v. Foster, 280 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1971) (stating report of investigation of jurors paid for by district attorney's office
and used in voir dire is not subject to discovery in criminal case); Linebarger v. State, 469
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (ruling State has no obligation to furnish defendant
with information regarding jurors' criminal record). But see UNIF. P. CalM. P. § 421(a), 10
U.L-A. 50 (Supp. 1987) (requiring prosecutors to disclose "reports on prospective jurors" upon
defendant's written request).
302. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) ("Applying
the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what 'funda-
mental fairness' consists of in a particular situation. ").
303. See id. (describing inquiry into requirements of fundamental fairness as "uncertain
enterprise").
304. See id. at 25 (describing process of discovering what fundamental fairness requires
in given set of circumstances).
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allowing prosecutors to use jurors' criminal history records in voir dire without
making the same information available to the defendant is unfair, 5 the major-
ity ofjurisdictions have reached the opposite conclusion."° Thus, the weight
of precedent supports a conclusion that the defendant does not suffer unfair-
ness by the prosecutor's use ofjurors' criminal records.
The next step requires a consideration of the various interests at stake in
the use of jurors' criminal records in voir dire.3 7 For prosecutors, jurors'
criminal records are a valuable tool in uncovering jurors who may harbor
prejudices against the government as a result of prior experiences with the
criminal justice system." 8 As one state supreme court has noted, defendants
do not have the same interest in using jurors' criminal records during voir
dire.3"9 Although ajuror's prior arrest or conviction may cause the juror to be
biased against the State,310 the defendant may actually benefit from the nega-
tive view the juror has of the police, prosecutors, or the government.
31'
Because prosecutors do have a valid interest in discovering the criminal
history of jurors, while defendants generally do not,312 defendants generally
do not suffer unfairness when courts allow prosecutors to use jurors' criminal
history records in voir dire.313
However, certain cases exist in which the defendant's interest in having
access to jurors' criminal records will mirror that of the prosecutor's - remov-
ing jurors who may harbor potential biases. For instance, the potential for
305. See supra notes 298-99 (listing cases requiring prosecutor to disclose jurors' criminal
records to defendant on grounds of fairness).
306. See supra notes 300-01 (listing cases refusing to require disclosure ofjurors' criminal
records).
307. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (describing two-step process of determin-
ing requirements of fundamental fairness).
308. See supra Part DIA (discussing prosecutor's interest in securing impartial jurors by
using criminal history data); see also State v. Jackson, 450 So. 2d 621, 628 (La. 1984) (recog-
nizing valid use ofjurors' criminal records by prosecutor as tool to challenge jurors with biases
against State).
309. See Jackson, 450 So. 2d at 628 (stating that jurors' criminal records are not pertinent
to defendant's purpose in voir dire, which is to challenge those jurors who will not be objective
in rendering verdict, not to pick jurors who are favorable to defendant).
310. See supra Part IlIA (discussing how prior criminal history increases potential for bias
against State by juror).
311. See Jackson, 450 So. 2d at 628 (discussing defendant's desire to use jurors' criminal
history records as aid in selecting jurors who were familiar with "police coercive tactics").
312. See id. (distinguishing prosecutor's valid purpose in using jurors' criminal history
records - to remove biased or disqualified jurors - from defendant's invalid purpose for using
these records - to select jurors favorable to defendant); see also State v. Bessenecker, 404
N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 1987) (en banc) (noting that defendant may not have same motive as
prosecutor in using jurors' criminal history records in voir dire).
313. See supra notes 300-01 (listing cases that have rejected claim that defendant suffers
unfairness by prosecutor's use ofjurors' criminal history records in voir dire).
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prejudice is obvious when a white juror convicted of a hate crime sits on the
jury for a black defendant.314 Another clear example of likely prejudice
involves a male juror convicted of domestic violence sitting on the jury of a
female defendant accused of murdering her abusive husband. In circum-
stances like these, the defendant's purpose in having access to jurors' criminal
history records will be the same as that of a prosecutor - to remove jurors with
a potential for bias.315 Thus, the defendant will have a valid interest in using
jurors' criminal history records equal to that of the prosecutor.316 In these
special circumstances, it would be unfair to allow only the prosecutor to use
jurors' criminal history records as atool in securing an impartial jury.
2. The Proper Remedy for Unfairness
Many courts either have required disclosure ofjurors' criminal records to
the defendant in all cases or have given trial courts the discretion to determine
whether disclosure should be required.31' Requiring disclosure in all cases
gives jurors' criminal records to defendants who do not have a valid interest in
those records.318 Instituting a general ban onthe use ofjurors' criminal history
records, as Chief Judge Chamblin did,319 creates problems as well. Prohibiting
any use of jurors' criminal history records in voir dire undermines both the
government and some defendants' right to an impartial jury.32
This Note proposes a solution that will remedy the unfairness that some
defendants suffer without interfering with the government's right to an impar-
tial and qualified jury.321 Recognizing that most defendants do not share the
314. See Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider, supra note 40, at 2 n.2 (stating that
"injustice would be manifest" if white juror convicted of hate crime sat on jury of black
defendant).
315. See supra Part liA (discussing purpose of removing potentially biased jurors as
prosecutor's reason for using jurors' criminal history records).
316. See State v. Jackson, 450 So. 2d 621, 628 (La. 1984) (noting validity of interest in
jurors' criminal history records to remove biased jurors).
317. See supra notes 298-99 (listing cases requiring disclosure to defendant, in one form
or other, ofjurors' criminal records).
318. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (discussing why most defendants do
not have valid interest in use ofjurors' criminal history records).
319. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Judge Chamblin's
order prohibiting use of jury lists to conduct criminal background checks on potential jurors).
320. See supra Part ILA (discussing adverse effect of prohibiting use of jurors' criminal
histories on government's right to impartial jury); supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text
(discussing when use of jurors' criminal history records relates to protecting defendant's right
to impartial jury).
321. See supra Part VLB.1 (discussing why only some defendants suffer unfairness from
prosecutor's exclusive use of jurors' criminal history records in voir dire); supra Part II (dis-
cussing government's right to impartial and qualified jury as implicated by use ofjurors' crim-
inal history records in voir dire).
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same valid interests as prosecutors in using jurors' criminal records, 322 courts
should require disclosure of these records to the defendant only upon a
showing that, as a result of special circumstances, the defendant has a valid
interest in jurors' criminal history records .31 Because defendants generally
do not have a valid interest in this information, 324 the defendant should bear
the burden of showing why fairness requires disclosure in the defendant's
situation.31 In order to make this showing, the defendant must do two things.
First, the defendant must specifically describe for the court the types of
criminal history incidents which concern him. For example, a woman defen-
dant accused of murdering her abusive husband would have an interest in any
arrests or convictions members of the jury may have had for any kind of
domestic violence. Second, the defendant then must make clear to the court
how these types of criminal history incidents could result in a juror being
prejudiced against the defendant. Unlike the court's rule in Bessenecker,326
the defendant need not show the unlikely availability of this information by
other means. If the defendant is successful in making this showing, the court
then will order disclosure to the defendant of only that criminal history
information about which the defendant has demonstrated a need. This pro-
posal best ensures fairness by providing access to jurors' criminal records to
all parties that have a valid interest in using those records without needlessly
giving information about jurors to those defendants who do not have the same
valid interest in the information.
VT. Conclusion
Although the text of the Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial jury
applies only to the accused, the government also enjoys that same right.
327
The voir dire process plays a critical role in securing an impartial jury for both
the defendant and the government .3 ' Experiences such as an arrest or a crim-
322. See supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text (discussing differences between inter-
ests of prosecutors in using jurors' criminal history records and interests of most defendants).
323. See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text (discussing special circumstances that
give defendant valid interest in using jurors' criminal history records in voir dire).
324. See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text (discussing why, as general rule,
defendants do not have valid interest in jurors' criminal history records).
325. But see State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Iowa 1987) (en bane) (requiring
disclosure of jurors' criminal history records to defendant unless prosecutor can show good
cause to contrary).
326. See id. (requiring prosecutors to show that means other than accessing criminal
history records is unlikely to reveal juror's criminal history information).
327. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing how right to impartial jury
applies to government as well as defendant).
328. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing importance of voir dire in
protecting right to impartial jury).
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inal conviction have the potential for creating in jurors a bias against the
government. 29 Criminal convictions also can disqualify a person from jury
service.33' Because criminal history records provide a comprehensive picture
of a person's exposure to the criminal justice system, these records provide
prosecutors with information helpful to determining a juror's potential bias
and possible disqualification. 3' Thus, prosecutors regard the ability to access
jurors' criminal history records as an invaluable tool for ensuring an impartial
and qualified jury.
Courts that confront the question of whether prosecutors can use jurors'
criminal history records in voir dire should look first for guidance from the
statutory scheme regulating criminal history records, following the example
of the courts in Bessenecker, Tagala, and McMahan.332 If the statutory
scheme is similar to those discussed above in Part IV.D, courts should allow
prosecutors to continue using jurors' criminal history records in voir dire,
notwithstanding a concern for the privacy rights of jurors. Jurors' right to
informational privacy does not attach to criminal history records because they
do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in these records.33 Even ifthe
right to informational privacy does attach to criminal history records, the
interests of the government, the defendant, and the public in using these
records outweigh the privacy interest ofjurors."'
Once courts decide that prosecutors can use jurors' criminal history
records in voir dire, they must decide whether the defendant has a right to
disclosure of these records. Defendants generally do not share the same valid
interest that prosecutors have in using jurors' criminal records in voir dire. 35
329. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (examining how arrests and criminal
convictions increase potential for bias in juror against government); supra Part I (describing
hypothetical scenario of how voir dire process may fail to detect and remove jurors biased
against government).
330. See supra note 81 (listing federal and state statutory provisions making some forms
of criminal convictions disqualification from jury service).
331. See supra Part III (discussing utility ofjurors' criminal history records in discovering
potential bias and possible disqualification).
332. See supra Parts IV.A-C (discussing approach of courts in Bessenecker, Tagala, and
McMahan).
333. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977) (discussing
legitimate expectation of privacy in information as first part of analysis to determine whether
disclosure of information violates person's right to informational privacy); supra Part
VA.2.b.(1) (discussing why jurors do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal
history records).
334. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458 (requiring courts to balance scope and nature of intrusion
into person's privacy against interests in disclosing disputed information); supra Part VA.2.b.2
(discussing interests of government, defendant, and public in use of jurors' criminal history
records in voir dire and why these interests outweigh jurors' privacy interest).
335. See supra Part V.B.1 (discussing what distinguishes prosecutors' interest in using
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However, some defendants do have that valid interest - removing biased
jurors - as a result ofthe special circumstances surrounding their cases.336 In
these cases, allowing only the prosecutor to use jurors' criminal history
records as a tool of voir dire is unfair to the defendant. To remedy unfairness,
courts should require disclosure of jurors' criminal history records to the
defendant only when the defendant can show that special circumstances have
created a valid interest in using these records.
The approach proposed in this Note is the best solution to the problem
Chief Judge Chamblin faced in Virginia. By first looking to the statutory
scheme regulating criminal history records, courts will ensure that the legisla-
ture decides whether to grant or to deny prosecutors the authority to use
jurors' criminal history records in voir dire. Once courts determine that the
legislature has given prosecutors this authority, utilization of this approach
will best protect the government's right to an impartial jury while safeguard-
ing the defendant from any possible unfairness.
jurors' criminal history records in voir dire from interest defendants generally have in using
these records).
336. See supra Part V.B.1 (discussing how special circumstances give defendant valid
interest in using jurors' criminal history records in voir dire).
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